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PROMOTING HEALTHCARE INNOVATION
ON THE DEMAND SIDE
Rebecca S. Eisenberg † & W. Nicholson Price II ‡
ABSTRACT
Innovation policy often focuses on the incentives of firms that sell new
products. But optimal use of healthcare products also requires good
information about the likely effects of products in different patients, and it is
hard to provide the right incentives for producers to develop and disclose
information that could limit future sales. Regulation partially fills this gap
by requiring sellers to conduct clinical trials and report adverse events. But
it is inherently problematic to rely on producers to supply negative
information about their own products.
Healthcare payers, however, can profit from avoiding inappropriate use
of costly technologies. Recent technological advances enable insurers to
innovate by analyzing their data about healthcare provision and outcomes.
The federal government seeks to promote this sort of innovation through a
series of initiatives; some picture insurers as passive data repositories,
while others provide opportunities for insurers to innovate more directly.
In this paper, we examine the role of health insurers in developing new
knowledge about the provision of quality healthcare—what we call
“demand-side innovation.” We address the contours of this underexplored
area of innovation and describe the behavior of participating firms. We
examine the legal rules surrounding privacy and their effects on this
research, and consider the effect of market structures and intellectual
property rules on incentives for demand-side innovation. Throughout, we
highlight the multi-pronged way that government facilitates payer
innovation, apart from the traditional tools of innovation policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Policy mechanisms to promote biopharmaceutical innovation often
focus on fortifying incentives for firms to develop new products.
Pharmaceutical firms favor exclusionary rights that defer competition,
allowing them to profit by charging higher prices prior to generic entry. In
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addition to providing patent term extensions for developers of new drugs, 1
Congress has repeatedly provided for periods of regulatory exclusivity to
encourage the same firms to collect and submit data about the effects of
their products in patients. 2 Providing better information about these effects
is an important form of innovation that distinguishes warfarin as a
therapeutic anti-coagulant for use in humans from the same substance as rat
poison. 3 But it is problematic to rely on product-developing firms to provide
this information, because although they might profit from favorable
information, they stand to lose from disclosure of negative information
about their own products. Regulatory mandates require sellers to produce
data from rigorous clinical trials showing that their products are safe and
effective as a condition for approval of new drugs. 4 But side effects are
difficult to observe in clinical trials of limited scope and duration. Often the
bad news only comes to light after products have been widely used; if the
news is bad enough it may lead to the withdrawal of previously approved
products from the market. 5 But the adverse events reporting system 6 that
FDA has long relied upon as its principal source of bad news after approval
is haphazard and unreliable. 7
Healthcare payers, 8 on the other hand, stand to profit from the bad news.
Information that an expensive drug has harmful side effects, or that it does
not work for many of the patients currently taking it, could lead to more
sparing use of these products, reducing healthcare costs while improving
quality of care. The incentives of payers to cut costs could be a
1

35 U.S.C. § 156.
These provisions include five years of regulatory exclusivity for submitting data
showing safety and efficacy for a new chemical entity, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); three
years for submitting data supporting a new use or product change that requires clinical
trials, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iv); twelve years for showing safety and efficacy for a new
biologic, 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7); five years for showing safety and efficacy for a new
qualified infectious disease product that targets any of a variety of resistant organisms, 21
U.S.C. § 355f; and six months for submitting data from clinical trials in children, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355a.
3
Douglas Wardrop & David Keeling, The story of the discovery of heparin and
warfarin, 141 BRITISH J. HAEMATOLOGY 757–763 (2008).
4
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1)(A), 355(d).
5
21 U.S.C. § 355(e).
6
21 C.F.R. § 314.80.
7
See, e.g., Fontanarosa PB et al., Postmarketing Surveillance—Lack of Vigilance,
Lack of Trust, 292 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 2647 (2004). 2007 legislation gave FDA greater
powers and duties with respect to monitoring and disclosing postapproval risks, including
authority to establish the Sentinel system discussed in greater detail infra in Part II.B.2.
8
We use the term “payer” to refer to third parties who pay for health treatment. The
term includes private insurers, public payers like Medicare and Medicaid, and integrated
health systems like Kaiser Permanente that provide both care and insurance.
2
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counterweight to the incentives of product sellers to maximize their own
patent-protected profits.
Recent advances in information technology and genomics have put
healthcare payers in an excellent position to play a larger role in future
innovation to improve healthcare through better understanding of the effects
of medical treatment. Insurance companies and integrated healthcare
providers have custody of a treasure trove of data about healthcare
provision and outcomes that can yield valuable insights about how to
improve the quality of healthcare and lower its costs. Some integrated
healthcare systems have seized upon this advantage to make notable
discoveries about the effects of particular products that have changed the
standard of care.
Studying the consequences of past clinical care to improve healthcare
practice is an important research frontier with the potential to yield valuable
innovations. Although it is easier to recognize innovation when a new
product is introduced than when new information leads to more sparing use
or even withdrawal of existing products from the market, in both cases new
knowledge is put to use to improve the quality of healthcare. Both are
socially valuable forms of innovation. But the distribution of benefits from
the two forms of innovation is quite different. Much of the social value of
new products accrues to product sellers, at least when they are protected
from competition by patents and regulatory exclusivity. On the other hand,
when further knowledge leads to more parsimonious use of existing
products, the benefit is captured on the demand side by payers and by
patients who save money and improve health by using less of these
products.
Healthcare payers enjoy several advantages that allow them to
complement the role of product-developing firms as providers of
information about the effects of healthcare products. First, payers have
access to large volumes of data from administrative claims and healthcare
records that reveal healthcare consequences. Second, payers have an
incentive to reduce healthcare costs rather than to increase them, providing
a counterweight to the incentives of product-developing firms. Third, the
observational studies that payers can pursue are cheaper than the controlled
clinical trials that swell the R&D budgets of product-developing firms.
Fourth, although randomized, controlled clinical trials have long been
considered the gold standard for studying treatment effects free of selection
bias, healthcare records may provide much larger datasets and observations
over longer periods of time, and can thus shed light on questions that
clinical trials leave unresolved.
The standard policy toolkit for promoting biomedical innovation offers
little in the way of direct benefits to these “demand side innovators,”
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although the exclusive rights that the legal system awards to developers of
new products may give payers an indirect incentive to learn more about
whether these products are worth their high costs. Rather than providing
payers with their own exclusive rights, the federal government has used a
variety of different mechanisms to promote the use of data from healthcare
records as a source of ongoing innovation. These mechanisms include
agency initiatives to use healthcare records for regulatory and research
purposes, such as FDA’s Sentinel System and NIH’s eMERGE consortium.
They also include new legislation to support these initiatives 9 and agency
rulemaking to address obstacles to research use of healthcare records. 10
Although some of these initiatives picture payers primarily as repositories
of data that others might analyze, they also provide opportunities for
insurers to become more fully engaged as partners in healthcare innovation.
Healthcare payers engage in medical innovation to an extent that is largely
unrecognized in the legal scholarship on innovation. Nevertheless, they
could potentially do much more.
This paper proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, we address the contours of
this underexplored area of innovation, and describe the resources and
opportunities available to payers. We show how payers are unable to claim
rewards for pursuing those opportunities from the usual IP toolkit of patents
and trade secrecy. Part II considers technical obstacles to medical
innovation by payers, focusing on the challenges of making payer data
useful for research, and government initiatives that have helped the industry
begin to address those challenges. In Part III, we examine legal privacy
barriers to using and assembling information, and administrative and
legislative avenues to lowering those barriers. Throughout, we highlight the
multi-pronged way that government facilitates payer innovation without
relying on exclusionary rights. Although these “demand side innovators” do
not directly benefit from the exclusionary rights favored by pharmaceutical
firms, they have nonetheless benefited from a variety of government
initiatives that have lowered the legal and technical barriers to innovation
while building collaborative networks to share information and expertise.

9

See, e.g., the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 11085, 121 Stat. 823; the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act of 2009, enacted under Title XIII of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115; the Affordable Care Act of 2010,
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119; and the Food and Drug Administration Safety and
Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-144.
10
See, e.g., recent HHS modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, discussed infra Part
III.C.
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I. INNOVATION BY HEALTH-CARE PAYERS

While payers may lack the scientific labs of pharmaceutical companies
and the front-line patient interactions of practicing physicians, they have
access to valuable health data that can shed light on questions about what
works in different clinical contexts and in different kinds of patients. These
data give payers an advantage in innovation to improve the choice of
appropriate treatments. This Part describes the innovation landscape for
payers. It begins by giving two examples of payer innovation that fit poorly
in a regulatory regime that was designed for the use of product-developing
firms. Next, it briefly canvasses the innovation resources and opportunities
available to payers, with a focus on research questions that payers might be
better positioned to address than product-developing firms. It concludes by
considering the standard toolkit of innovation incentives from the
perspective of innovating payers.
A. Examples
Two extended examples highlight both the potential benefits of payer
innovation and the limited opportunities for payers to inform regulatory
decisions in a legal regime designed for innovation by drug-developing
firms. The first involves a request by payers to FDA to switch the terms of
approval for the antihistamines Allegra, Claritin, and Zyrtec from
prescription (Rx) to over-the-counter (OTC) sales. The second tells the
story of the painkiller Vioxx, and illustrates the reluctance of FDA to use
data from payer records rather than from drug company clinical trials to
establish toxic side effects in a previously approved product. It is no
coincidence that both involve widely prescribed, patent-protected
blockbuster products that were costing payers a lot of money.
1. Rx-to-OTC Switch: Non-sedating antihistamines
The first example illustrates the divergent interests of payers and drug
manufacturers in the context of regulatory approval for switching drugs
from prescription (Rx) to OTC sales. 11 An Rx-to-OTC switch can be a
11

The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provides that a drug which “is not safe for use
except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug” or
which is limited by the terms of its regulatory approval to use under the professional
supervision of such a practitioner shall be dispensed by prescription only. 21 U.S.C. §
353(b). For a discussion of how FDA implements the distinction between Rx and OTC
drugs, see Holly M. Spencer, The Rx-to-OTC Switch of Claritin, Allegra, and Zyrtec: An
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significant cost-lowering innovation for at least two reasons. 12 First, it
permits patients to treat themselves without incurring the costs and delays
associated with seeing a doctor for a prescription. Second, it often leads to a
significant price reduction for the drug itself, because health insurance
typically covers Rx but not OTC drugs and cost-sensitive patients may be
unwilling to pay the high prices that drug companies charge insurance
companies. 13
In 1998, Blue Cross of California (later Wellpoint) submitted a petition
to FDA asking it to permit OTC sales of nonsedating antihistamines sold
under the brand names Allegra, Claritin, and Zyrtec. 14 Blue Cross/Wellpoint
argued that nonsedating antihistamines were safer than older antihistamines,
already available OTC, which had significant sedative side effects.
According to the petition, the lack of OTC access to the safer nonsedating
products “results in a greater incidence of side effects associated with the
OTC alternatives adding considerable unnecessary medical costs to the
health care system.” Of course, the switch would also save costs for Blue
Cross/Wellpoint by allowing patients to purchase their own nonsedating
antihistamines out of their own pockets in the OTC market rather than using
insurance to pay for doctor visits and prescriptions.
Unprecedented FDA Response to Petitioners and the Protection of Public Health, 51 AM.
U. L. REV. 999, 1011-18 (2002).
12
For an estimate of cost savings from the availability of OTC drugs, see Consumer
Healthcare Products Ass’n, The Value of OTC Medicine to the United States (2012),
http://www.chpa.org/ValueofOTCMeds2012.aspx (estimating drug cost savings of
approximately $25 billion per year and clinical visit cost savings of approximately $66
billion per year). Because drug companies often seek an Rx-to-OTC switch at the same
time that they lose patent protection for a drug, it is not always clear how much of a price
reduction is a consequence of the switch itself and how much is a result of competition
following the loss of patent protection. At a minimum one would expect the lower costs of
dispensing OTC products relative to that for Rx products to lead to some price reduction.
On the other hand, from the perspective of consumers, the out-of-pocket cost of an OTC
drug may exceed the out-of-pocket cost for the co-pay on a prescription drug that is
otherwise covered by insurance. See Joshua P. Cohen, Cherie Paquette & Catherine P.
Cairns, Switching prescription drugs to over the counter, 330 BRITISH MED. J. 39–41
(2005) (concluding that switching drugs to OTC availability reduces insurers’ prescription
drug costs but increases the costs for most patients); cf. Peter Temin, Realized Benefits
from Switching Drugs, 35 J.L. & ECON. 351-369 (1992) (concluding that OTC switches
have both reduced costs and increased consumer welfare).
13
Cohen et al., supra note 12 (noting in survey of 12 managed care organizations “a
strong tendency to remove switched drugs from the formulary and raise copayments of
prescription drugs in the same class” following an OTC switch).
14
Letter dated July 21, 1998 from Robert C. Seidman to Dockets Management Branch,
Food & Drug Admin., Docket 98P-0610 (1998), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/
dockets/98p0610/cp00001.pdf.
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The product manufacturers opposed the switch, arguing that Blue
Cross/Wellpoint had failed to submit adequate supporting data to establish
the safety and efficacy of the nonsedating products when used without the
supervision of a physician. 15 While it may seem odd for product
manufacturers to warn regulators about the potential hazards of their
products, in this case it was entirely consistent with their own financial
interests. Drug manufacturers typically wait to seek approval for an Rx-toOTC switch until the drug approaches the end of its patent life, when
generic competition is about to erode profits. At that point, the firm may
seek to mitigate the loss of revenue by invoking a statutory incentive of
exclusivity for conducting further clinical trials to support a change in the
terms of regulatory approval. 16 If further clinical trials are “essential” to
FDA approval of an application for the switch, the manufacturer is entitled
to three years of exclusivity before FDA will approve a generic product for
OTC sales. 17 This supplemental exclusivity gives the branded product a 3year head start in the OTC market. A switch prior to patent expiration
would surrender more lucrative exclusivity in the Rx market in exchange
for less lucrative exclusivity in the OTC market, and would hasten the
arrival of full competition by allowing the OTC exclusivity to run during
the patent term. But because the statute authorizes further exclusivity only if
new clinical trials are essential for approval, and not if it is already apparent
that the product is safe for OTC sale without further study, the
manufacturers had to persuade FDA that more data were necessary to
support the switch. In other words, the Blue Cross/Wellpoint petition not
only threatened to end payer coverage of nonsedating antihistamines, but
also undermined the case for three years of exclusivity in the OTC market.
15

See letter dated Jan. 15, 1999 from Alexander R. Jacquinto to Dockets Management
Branch, Food & Drug Admin., Docket 98P-0610 (1999), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/dockets/98p0610/c000004.pdf; Schering Plough Research Institute, Briefing Book
(April 12, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3737b_15_scheringplough.pdf.
16
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)
17
The statute provides in pertinent part:
If a supplement to [a previously approved new drug application or NDA] is
approved after September 24, 1984, and the supplement contains reports of new
clinical investigations … essential to the approval of the supplement and
conducted or sponsored by the person submitting the supplement, [FDA] may not
make the approval of an application submitted under this subsection [i.e., an
Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking approval to market a generic version
without having to repeat the showing of safety and efficacy in the original NDA]
for a change approved in the supplement effective before the expiration of three
years from the date of the approval of the supplement ….
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iv).
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FDA asked an advisory committee whether nonsedating antihistamines
“could be used appropriately and safely by consumers without the
intervention of a learned intermediary,” 18 and the committee concluded that
they could. 19 But although FDA seemed to have the authority to make such
a switch on the petition of a payer, 20 it was unprecedented and controversial
to grant such a petition over the objection of the drug manufacturer. 21 The
more traveled pathway was for the manufacturer to initiate an OTC switch
by filing a supplemental new drug application at a time of its choosing. And
sure enough, Schering-Plough filed its own application for an Rx-to-OTC
switch for Claritin—the first of the nonsedating antihistamines to face
patent expiration—eleven months after opposing the Blue Cross/Wellpoint
petition on the ground that the data were insufficient to support such a
switch. 22 FDA approved the Schering-Plough application on November 27,
2002, without ruling on the Blue Cross/Wellpoint petition.23 The patent
protecting Claritin expired three weeks later. 24
This episode shows how the interest of payers in reducing healthcare
costs diverges from the interest of product manufacturers in maximizing
revenues, making payers more eager to pursue a cost-lowering innovation
(such as an Rx-to-OTC switch) that a manufacturer would rather defer. The
statutory incentive of regulatory exclusivity may eventually motivate a
manufacturer to conduct clinical trials and to pursue an Rx-to-OTC switch
just prior to patent expiration. But payers might find it worthwhile to pursue
this innovation more promptly and without the need for propping up prices
18

Food & Drug Admin., FDA Overview of Issues for the Joint Nonprescription Drugs
Advisory Committee and the Pulmonary-Allergy Drugs Advisory Committee (May 11,
2001), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3737b_02_overview.pdf.
19
Claritin Approval Marks Significant Shift in Rx-to-OTC Switches, 666 FOOD &
DRUG LETTER, (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.rahasia.biz/reading/claritin-approval-markssignificant-shift-in-rx-to-otc-Myvf.html.
20
The statute provides that FDA “may by regulation remove drugs … from the [Rx
only] requirements when such requirements are not necessary for the protection of the
public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(3). FDA regulations authorize either the FDA
Commissioner or “any interested person” to petition for a switch:
A proposal to exempt a drug from the prescription-dispensing requirements of
section 503(b)(1)(C) of the act may be initiated by the Commissioner or by any
interested person. Any interested person may file a petition seeking such
exemption, which petition may be pursuant to part 10 of this chapter [which
governs citizen petitions such as that submitted by Blue Cross/Wellpoint], or in
the form of a supplement to an approved new drug application.”
21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b).
21
See id.; Spencer, supra note 11.
22
Spencer, supra note 11, at 1023–24.
23
Melody Peterson, Claritin to Sell Over the Counter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2002).
24
Id.
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through regulatory exclusivity. Moreover, because they do not stand to gain
from persuading FDA that costly clinical trials are necessary to support a
switch, payers may be willing to show safety at lower cost by consulting
their own data generated from clinical experience with the drug without
unnecessary clinical trials. 25
2. Post-Approval Studies
The second example concerns exposure of a toxic side effect of the
blockbuster drug Vioxx through research in health records of the integrated
healthcare provider Kaiser Permanente. Vioxx is a selective Cox-2
inhibitive non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) for relieving pain
and inflammation without the gastric side effects of an earlier generation of
NSAIDs (such as aspirin and ibuprofen). 26 The manufacturer Merck
voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market in the fall of 2004, at a time
when it was selling $2.5 billion per year, in the face of mounting evidence
that Vioxx was causing fatal heart attacks. 27
Data from Merck-sponsored clinical trials comparing Vioxx to naproxen
(one of the older generation of NSAIDs) had previously shown more heart
attacks (as well as fewer gastric side effects 28)in patients taking Vioxx 29,
but Merck had argued that the difference in heart attacks reflected a
protective effect of naproxen rather than a toxic effect of Vioxx. 30 FDA was
not convinced, 31 and Merck agreed to provide warnings about
cardiovascular risks while it continued to monitor cardiovascular safety in
25

The data submitted by Blue Cross/Wellpoint primarily concerned the risks posed by
the sedating effects of the earlier antihistamines that were already available in the OTC
market, including a study from the National Transportation Safety Board of deaths from
traffic accidents involving drivers who had used sedating antihistamines. Id. at 1019–1021.
26
See Statement of Sandra Kweder, M.D., Deputy Director, Office of New Drugs,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., before the Senate
Comm. On Finance, (Nov. 18 2004) [Kweder testimony], http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/
testimony/ucm113235.htm.
27
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VIOXX (ROFECOXIB) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Sept.
30,
2004),
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/
postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm106290.htm.
28
See Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of
Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 1520–
28 (2000).
29
See Memorandum from Shari L. Targum to Sandra Cook re Consultation NDA 21042, S-007 Review of cardiovascular safety database (Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3677b2_06_cardio.pdf.
30
Id., at 1526–27.
31
Memorandum from Shari L. Targum, supra note 29, at 34–35.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2016

11

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 125 [2016]

PROMOTING HEALTHCARE INNOVATION

11

additional clinical trials of Vioxx for new indications. 32 Meanwhile,
millions of patients took Vioxx, many of whom were at low risk of gastric
side effects and could have received the same benefits at less risk and at
lower cost from one of the older nonselective NSAIDs. 33
While Merck’s clinical trials proceeded, Dr. David Graham from the
FDA Office of Drug Safety began a collaborative study with Kaiser
Permanente comparing health records of patients who took Vioxx with
those who took other NSAIDs. That study showed significantly more heart
attacks in the Vioxx patients, 34 leading Kaiser Permanente to reconsider
whether to provide coverage of Vioxx. 35 But according to Dr. Graham’s
Congressional testimony, FDA sought to suppress publication of the
study. 36 Dr. Graham explained that FDA’s primary institutional mission is
approving new drugs, not re-evaluating already approved drugs. Moreover,
FDA has long favored clinical trials over observational studies. 37 Both of
these factors favor reliance on the data submitted by drug companies over
that coming from other sources with different motivations.
In the case of Vioxx, the same cardiovascular effects that showed up in
the Kaiser Permanente data were becoming too clear to overlook even in
data from ongoing Merck clinical trials. 38 Shortly after the Kaiser
32

Kweder testimony, supra note 26.
Carolanne Dai et al., National Trends in Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor Use Since
Market Release: Nonselective Diffusion of a Selectively Cost-effective Innovation, 165
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 171-177 (2005). Merck later paid substantial criminal fines for
“misbranding” Vioxx by promoting and marketing it beyond the scope of FDA-approved
uses. U.S. Justice Dept. Press Release, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company Merck Sharp &
Dohme Sentenced in Connection with Unlawful Promotion of Vioxx (April 19, 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm301329.htm.
34
Kweder testimony, supra note 26; David J. Graham et al., Risk of acute myocardial
infarction and sudden cardiac death in patients treated with cyclooxygenase-2 selective
and nonselective non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs: nested case-control study, 365
LANCET 475–481 (2005).
35
Anna Wilde Matthews & Scott Hensley, Big HMO Reconsiders Vioxx After Study
Points to Heart Risks, WALL ST. J. (August 26, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB109346588678101103?cb=logged0.44817835511639714.
36
Testimony of David J. Graham before the Senate Finance Committee (Nov. 18,
2004), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111804dgtest.pdf. According to Dr.
Graham’s testimony, the Director of the FDA Office of New Drugs sent him an email
suggesting that “since FDA was ‘not contemplating’ a warning against the use of high-dose
Vioxx, my conclusions should be changed,” id. at 3.
37
Id. at 4.
38
Robert S. Bresalier et al., Cardiovascular Events Associated with Rofecoxib in a
Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 1092–1102 (2005). The
Merck-sponsored study was designed primarily to show that Vioxx was effective in
preventing recurrent colon polyps rather than to measure cardiovascular side effects.
33

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/125

12

Eisenberg and Price:

12

EISENBERG & PRICE

Permanente data were presented at an international conference, Merck
voluntarily agreed to withdraw Vioxx from the market, 39 and under the
intense glare of Congressional and media attention, FDA allowed Dr.
Graham to publish the Kaiser-Permanente study in a leading medical
journal. 40 Once again, FDA took no action until the drug manufacturer
came around to the same conclusion as the payer.
The Vioxx episode showed the potential of large-scale observational
studies to illuminate questions that were left ambiguous in data from drug
company clinical trials. Healthcare payers have the necessary data for
observational studies and face different incentives than drug companies.
The availability of data that is not controlled by the drug companies opens
the door to analysis that is free of the possible distortions and wishful
thinking of a company that is making billions of dollars a year selling a
blockbuster product. FDA has long treated data from clinical trials as
proprietary information belonging to the drug company that paid for the
trials, and has therefore prevented public scrutiny of the data. But data from
patient health records are not under the proprietary control of the drug
companies and could be analyzed by other parties with different interests,
such as Kaiser Permanente and its collaborators.
B. Resources
Payers possess tremendous amounts of valuable health data about
individuals. At this time, the longest-term and most readily available form
of payer data is administrative claims data. These data include the
information necessary to process payment claims, providing a view of
medical encounters over time. Administrative claims data typically record
diagnoses and treatments for patients, hospital admissions and releases, tests
performed and their results, prescriptions filled, and professional services
provided, as well as demographic information about patients (such as age,
sex, and location) and the identities of providers. 41
Payers also frequently have access to other data sources that can
supplement administrative claims data. They typically have prescription
payment records that reveal when patients actually pick up and pay for
drugs (as opposed to merely getting the prescription), and when they refill
39

Kweder testimony, supra note 26
Thomas H. Maugh II, Banned Report on Vioxx Published, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/25/science/sci-vioxx25.
41
Sebastian Schneeweiss & Jerry Avorn, A Review of Uses of Health Care Utilization
Databases for Epidemiologic Research on Therapeutics, 58 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 323, 323
(2005).
40
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prescriptions. Payers typically know when patients are referred to
specialists and why. They may have access to laboratory test results under
contracts with laboratory test providers, especially when tests are performed
by major national providers rather than in-house. 42
In addition, it is increasingly common for payers to have access to
patient medical records generated by doctors and other caregivers. These
records can provide richer data on treatment and outcomes than
administrative claims data, although analyzing them can be challenging due
to variability across providers in what is included and how they are
written. 43
Integrated health systems that combine the functions of payer, health
care coordinator, and health care provider are particularly likely to have
access to medical records. Notable examples of integrated health systems
include Kaiser Permanente; 44 Geisinger; 45 Highmark; Intermountain
Healthcare; 46 and the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs. 47 In the
Kaiser system, for example, members pay premiums to Kaiser and see
doctors who are Kaiser employees in Kaiser offices or hospitals. 48
Integrated health systems may have centralized custody of records that are
otherwise likely to be dispersed across multiple custodians in other parts of
the healthcare system, reducing the need to gather data from multiple
sources. 49 In the overall health system, a relatively small fraction of patients
belong to integrated health systems, but these systems have been important
participants in research to date using data from electronic health records. 50
Payers may use these data for their own research, provide them to other
42

Conversations with anonymous industry members and consultants.
For a more detailed discussion of challenges with patient medical records, see infra
Part II.A
44
See www.kaiserpermanente.org
45
See www.geisinger.org, www.highmark.com
46
See www.intermountainhealthcare.org
47
The Department of Defense’s Tricare offers healthcare to 9.2 million eligible
military personnel and families. http://www.tricare.mil/stakeholders/statistics.cfm. The
Veterans Administration provides medical care to veterans and had 8.9 million enrollees in
2013. http://www.va.gov/HEALTHPOLICYPLANNING/enroll02/Fnl925Doc.pdf.
48
See RICKEY HENDRICKS, A MODEL FOR NATIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE HISTORY OF
KAISER PERMANENTE (1993).
49
In integrated health systems, data formats and the difference between claims data
and clinical data may differ from typical payer-only systems since claims data are not
needed to actually pay claims, but rather for internal accounting and measurement
purposes.
50
Integrated health systems are not the only way to integrate; some entities, like Cal
INDEX, are allowing payers to overcome barriers to integrate data without working in an
integrated system. See infra notes 143–149 and accompanying text.
43
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researchers, or enter into collaborations with others to use the data for
innovation. 51
C. Opportunities
Payers have the opportunity and incentive to engage in valuable forms
of innovation that are under-provided by other innovators. Innovation based
on payer data can improve the quality of care and decrease costs, potentially
giving innovating firms competitive advantages and increased profits. 52 In
particular, payers stand to benefit from innovation to identify harmful
effects of treatment and to compare different treatment options. This
includes both traditional comparative effectiveness research and new
research in personalized medicine enabled by advances in genomics and
information technology. Payer innovation efforts like United Health’s
Optum 53 or Anthem’s HealthCore 54 conduct both internal research and
external work for other entities like pharmaceutical companies or other
payers. 55 This innovation offers potential benefits for patients and payers
alike.
1. Drug toxicity
Drugs frequently have a wide range of side effects that have not yet
been fully identified at the time they are initially approved for sale. Payers
are especially well positioned to identify these side effects, which may
sometimes change the determination that the drug is safe and effective.
Side effects often go unnoticed before approval because of limitations in
the clinical trial process. Clinical trials typically involve only a few
thousand patients, and occur over the course of a few months to a few
51

Payers may either sell their data to nonpayers or enter into research collaborations
with them. See, e.g., www.healthcore.com/academic (describing academic collaboration
with Anthem’s HealthCore innovation unit and potential use of Anthem’s data). In
addition, Medicare provides a rich dataset of health information about its enrollees, but the
scope of research on those data is circumscribed by the fact that Medicare is largely
available only to the elderly and some non-elderly with disabilities.
52
Elsewhere, we discuss how various factors decrease insurer cost sensitivity, and
acknowledge that these factors may decrease the incentive to innovate. See infra Part I.D.1.
53
See Optum, About Us, https://www.optum.com/about.html (last visited July 16,
2015) (“As a health services and innovation company, we combine data and analytics with
technology and expertise to power modern health care.”).
54
Healthcore, Home, www.healthcore.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
55
See, e.g., www.healthcore.com/government, /academics, /life-science-companies,
and /payersproviders (listing opportunities for research and publications resulting from
collaborations in various categories).
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years. 56 The relatively small test population means that drug developers are
unlikely to observe toxicity that occurs only in a small fraction of patients,
or in a population not included in the clinical trials. 57 Enrollment criteria for
clinical trials often exclude patients who are pregnant or are taking other
medications, for example, and therefore provide no information about the
effects of the study drug in these patients. 58 Similarly the relatively short
duration of clinical trials makes it difficult for developers to observe longterm effects of the drug. As a result, one in five approved drugs later receive
at least one new “black-box warning”—the strongest type of warning—after
approval. 59 Of the drugs that acquire black-box warnings after approval, it
takes an average of 10 years before the effect is confirmed and the warning
is added. 60
Once a drug has been approved and is in clinical use, payers begin to
accumulate longer-term observational data that permit them to observe
previously unnoticed drug toxicity effects. The Vioxx example illustrates
the potential of this type of payer innovation.
Payer records are not the only way to learn of post-approval drug
toxicity. Side effects may become apparent in the course of further clinical
trials by the seller of the drug, as happened in Merck’s clinical trial of
Vioxx for a new indication. 61 Drug manufacturers, doctors, and patients

56

In fact, drug developers have strong incentives to complete clinical trials as quickly
as possible. Patents on the drug itself are typically filed very early in development, and the
limited patent term means that time spent in clinical trials reduces the period of high-profit
patent-protected sales. See ERIC BUDISH ET AL., DO FIXED PATENT TERMS DISTORT
INNOVATION? EVIDENCE FROM CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19430 (finding that drug
companies disproportionately focus on drugs with shorter clinical trial period times).
57
See Jesse A. Berlin et al., Adverse Event Detection in Drug Development:
Recommendations and Obligations Beyond Phase 3, 98 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1366
(2008).
58
See Marshall Godwin et al., Pragmatic Controlled Clinical Trials in Primary Care:
The Struggle between External and Internal Validity, 3 BMC MED. RES. METHODOL. 28
(2003); Greer Donley, Encouraging Maternal Sacrifice: How Regulations Governing the
Consumption of Pharmaceuticals During Pregnancy Prioritize Fetal Safety over Maternal
Health and Autonomy, NYU REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 45 (2013).
59
Sean Hennessy & Brian L. Strom, Improving Postapproval Drug Safety
Surveillance: Getting Better Information Sooner, 55 ANNU. REV. PHARMACOL. TOXICOL.
75, 76 (2015).
60
Id. at 76. Short durations of clinical trials may also obscure the actual health
outcomes of interest, Jonathan J. Darrow et al., New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category —
Implications for Patients, 370 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1252, 1253–54 (2014), a problem that can
also potentially be addressed by innovating payers using longer-term data.
61
See supra Part I.A.2.
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may also report side effects to FDA. 62 But this passive reporting system
depends upon someone making a connection between the adverse event and
the drug and going to the trouble of reporting it. Such reports are unlikely to
provide information on increases in the frequency of otherwise common
ailments, such as the cardiovascular side effects among patients who took
Vioxx. 63
After the Vioxx episode, Congress fortified FDA’s authority to require
drug manufacturers to conduct postmarket surveillance studies. 64 At the
same time, Congress directed FDA to establish a system for monitoring
drug adverse events through use of health records, a mandate that FDA is
implementing in its Sentinel program, discussed below. 65 Other
international health agencies have similar programs. 66
But while these programs give regulators access to data from a network
of payers, the data can only answer the queries that are submitted to it. FDA
continues to rely primarily on adverse event reports to identify new risks.
Payers with an interest in lowering the costs and improving the quality of
healthcare have an opportunity to play an active role in identifying
appropriate queries by scrutinizing their own data for evidence of drug
toxicity, either ahead of regulators or in partnership with them.
2. Comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
Payers are in an excellent position to study the comparative
effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of different treatment interventions.
Comparative effectiveness research compares health outcomes for
62

FDA maintains these reports in a database called the FDA Adverse Event Reporting
System (FAERS) that it monitors for evidence of potential safety concerns. Doctors and
patients may voluntarily report adverse events directly to FDA at http://www.fda.gov/
Safety/MedWatch/, but the majority of voluntary information received by FDA comes
through reports to drug manufacturers, which in turn must report adverse events to FDA.
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80, 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1) (requiring drug manufacturers to submit
adverse event reports to FDA).
63
Hennessy & Strom, supra note 59, at 77.
64
Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, FDA was given
statutory authority to require postapproval studies or clinical trials if passive and active
surveillance will be insufficient to address known or potential serious risks. FDAAA § 901,
codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINICAL TRIALS—IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505
(O)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (2011). These provisions are
more fully discussed infra at Part II.B.2.
65
See infra Part II.B.2.
66
See Hennessy & Strom, supra note 59, at 79–81 (listing large government-sponsored
adverse-event population-surveillance databases).

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2016

17

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 125 [2016]

PROMOTING HEALTHCARE INNOVATION

17

interventions; cost-effectiveness research further considers costs to
determine which intervention buys more health for the money. 67 Comparing
the effects of different interventions is a valuable form of research that is
often neglected in the premarket stage. Premarket clinical trials typically
compare a new drug with a placebo rather than with another intervention,
unless the drug developer seeks approval to make specific marketing claims
of superiority to alternative treatments, 68 and consequently provide little
information about whether the new drug is better or worse than alternative
treatments. Comparative effectiveness studies may involve clinical trials, in
which researchers randomly assign patients to receive one drug or the other,
or data-based observational studies, in which researchers observe
differences in outcomes between matched populations of patients that
received each course of treatment.
Payers, both public and private, are in a good position to conduct
comparative effectiveness research through observational studies. As
previously noted, they have access to large datasets of patient records,
including information about diagnoses and drug prescriptions and
purchases. 69 Although administrative claims data may not indicate how well
the intervention worked (beyond such crude indicators as hospital
readmissions), patient health records may include richer data about
outcomes.
Moreover, cost-sensitive payers have strong incentives to perform
comparative effectiveness—and especially cost-effectiveness—research.
Other performers of comparative effectiveness research face different

67

See Alan M. Garber & Harold C. Sox, The Role Of Costs In Comparative
Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1805, 1807–09 (2010) (describing and comparing
comparative effectiveness research and cost-effectiveness research). Exactly how to
measure “more effective” or “more health” are knotty issues, which have spawned a major
literature including the calculation of Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) and
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), global surveys of patient preferences, and many
other techniques. See, e.g., Marthe R. Gold et al., HALYs and QALYs and DALYs, Oh My:
Similarities and Differences in Summary Measures of Population Health, 23 ANNU. REV.
PUBLIC HEALTH 115 (2002); Franco Sassi, Calculating QALYs, Comparing QALY and
DALY Calculations, 21 HEALTH POL’Y PLAN. 402 (2006). We do not address these issues
here.
68
For example, when Merck developed Vioxx, it conducted clinical trials comparing
the experience of patients taking Vioxx with those taking the older NSAID naproxen, and
used those studies to support the marketing claim that Vioxx had fewer gastric side effects
than naproxen. Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of
Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 1526–
27 (2000). See supra Part I.A..
69
See supra Part I.A.
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incentives and constraints. Academic institutions, 70 nonprofit
organizations, 71 and government-created comparative effectiveness
institutes focus on public health goals rather than cost control. In fact, the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute created by the Affordable
Care Act is prohibited by statute from performing certain types of costeffectiveness research. 72 These institutions generally need to partner with
payers for access to data. Doctors and hospitals have some access to health
data, although they too may find it advantageous to partner with payers to
obtain access to larger datasets that include data from different providers.
But doctors and hospital may have perverse incentives under a classical feefor-service model, because they make more money by providing more (and
more expensive) treatments. 73 Finally, drug companies have the capability
to conduct comparative effectiveness research, through both clinical trials
and observational studies, and an incentive to demonstrate that their new
products are better than older drugs. However, this incentive is biased in
one direction; comparative effectiveness research runs the risk of showing
that a new drug is worse than existing treatments. Since placebo-controlled
trials are generally enough to win regulatory approval, they may decide not
to take the risk of demonstrating inferiority rather than superiority for the
patent-protected product.
Payers have different incentives, which could make them an important
source of comparative effectiveness research and cost effectiveness
research. For example, Mayo Clinic researchers used Optum Labs data to
70

For example, Harvard’s Comparative Effectiveness Research Initiative focuses on
“public health and health systems interventions.” http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
comparative-effectiveness-research-initiative/
71
For example, the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review’s New England
Comparative Effectiveness Public Advisory Council, http://cepac.icer-review.org/, has
produced comparative effectiveness reports on treatments for opioid dependence, type 2
diabetes, and depression, as well as on the use of community health workers and on
behavioral health integration into medical care. Comparative Effectiveness Public Advisory
Council, Reports, http://cepac.icer-review.org/adaptations/ (last visited July 14, 2015).
72
The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) was created by the
Affordable Care Act to conduct comparative effectiveness research. However, it is
statutorily prohibited from certain types of cost-effectiveness research. PCORI “shall not
develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year . . . as a threshold to establish
what type of health care is cost effective or recommended.” ACA § 6301, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1320e–1(e). But see Nicholas Bagley, Who says PCORI can’t do costeffectiveness?, http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/who-says-pcori-cant-do-costeffectiveness/ (Oct. 14, 2013) (arguing that PCORI is not actually prohibited from such
research, while acknowledging widespread views inside and outside the Institute that it is).
Medicare and Medicaid are prohibited from using any such threshold to make coverage
determinations. ACA § 6301(e).
73
See infra Part I.D.
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determine that newer anticoagulant drugs have a higher risk of
gastrointestinal bleeding among older patients. 74 Despite the greater
convenience of the newer—and more expensive—drugs, this risk may make
these drugs less appropriate for those older patients. 75 Overall, the
competing incentives of different stakeholders provide counterweights that
can provide a more balanced understanding than reliance on data from any
one kind of innovator.
3. Off-label use
Payers can also contribute to understanding and supporting off-label use
of drugs. Pre-approval clinical trials often focus on relatively narrow
indications to simplify the showing of efficacy and safety necessary to get
regulatory approval. But once a drug becomes available, doctors are free to
prescribe it for other purposes that are not indicated in the FDA-approved
label for the product. In some fields, such as oncology, off-label use of
products for indications beyond the scope of FDA approval is quite
common. 76 Drug companies have relatively low incentives to conduct costly
clinical trials to provide evidence for off-label use, especially once such use
enters into widespread practice; firms might benefit from increased drug
sales without having to incur the costs and risks of further trials. Many offlabel uses are, unsurprisingly, unsupported by rigorous evidence, even when
they have become the standard of care. 77
FDA has long sought to motivate drug companies to conduct further
clinical trials of off-label uses by preventing firms from promoting their
products for off-label use. FDA takes the position that promotion of a
product for off-label uses renders the product “misbranded” in violation of

74

Neena Abraham, et al., Comparative risk of gastrointestinal bleeding with
dabigatran, rivaroxaban, and warfarin: population based cohort study, BRIT. MED. J. 350
(2015).
75
See Constantinos Michaelidis, Risk of GI Bleeding With Use of NOACs for Atrial
Fibrillation: Commentary on Two Recent Cohort, American College of Cardiology : Latest
in Cardiology (Jul. 14, 2015), http://www.acc.org/latest-in-cardiology/articles/2015/07/14/
12/14/risk-of-gi-bleeding-with-use-of-noacs-for-atrial-fibrillation.
76
See, e.g., Dominique Levêque, Off-Label Use of Anticancer Drugs, 9 LANCET
ONCOL. 1102 (2008); Rena M. Conti et al., Prevalence of Off-Label Use and Spending in
2010 Among Patent-Protected Chemotherapies in a Population-Based Cohort of Medical
Oncologists, 31 J. CLIN. ONCOL. 1134 (2013) (finding 30% off-label use of ten leading
patent-protected intravenous chemotherapeutics, and over 50% off-label use for some).
77
See Largent EA et al., Going off-Label without Venturing off-Course: Evidence and
Ethical off-Label Prescribing, 169 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1745 (2009) (describing different
levels of evidence for off-label use).
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the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. 78 But recent judicial decisions have held
that the First Amendment protects drug companies and their sales force
from criminal prosecution for promoting off-label use. 79 Moreover, once a
generic version of the drug is available, the original sponsor has little
incentive to invest in costly clinical trials of off-label uses for a product that
is no longer profitable. 80
Payers have the incentive to ensure that off-label uses are effective and
supported by evidence, because ineffective uses are wasted money. 81 They
also have the data to observe the effectiveness of off-label uses that have
already entered into practice. Observational studies in payer health records
may provide a more cost-effective alternative for filling the information gap
about the effects of off-label uses of drugs.
4. Prevention and long-term effects
Pre-approval clinical trials are necessarily limited in duration, and thus
have limited value in determining long-term health effects over an extended
period of time. We noted above that clinical trials may fail to reveal toxic
side effects that manifest over time. 82 For some products, such as vaccines
and other prophylactic measures to prevent disease or forestall its
progression, long-term effects are critical for determining not just safety,
but also efficacy. 83 In recent decades FDA has adapted its regulatory
approach to permit approval of some products on the basis of data on
“surrogate markers” rather than requiring that trials continue for years to
measure disease endpoints. 84 This allows products to get to market that
78

21 U.S.C. § 352
U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012); Amarin Pharma v. FDA (No. 2015-cv03588, Docket No. 73, S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015) (order granting preliminary relief
preventing FDA misbranding action for off-label promotion involving truthful statements).
80
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 717 (2005).
81
Cf. Monika K. Krzyzanowska, Off-Label Use of Cancer Drugs: A Benchmark Is
Established, 31 J. CLIN. ONCOL. 1125, 1126 (2013) (“[I]n the short term, the greatest
opportunity to optimize off-label prescribing is likely at the reimbursement level. . . . On
the part of payers, there should be greater scrutiny of reimbursement for drugs that are
potentially toxic and expensive and are associated with a high proportion of off-label
prescribing.”).
82
See supra Part I.C.1.
83
See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EVALUATION OF BIOMARKERS AND SURROGATE
ENDPOINTS IN CHRONIC DISEASE 38–45 (2010) [EVALUATION OF BIOMARKERS].
84
See, e.g., Russell Katz, Biomarkers and Surrogate Markers: An FDA Perspective, 1
NEURORX 189 (2004); Thomas R. Fleming & John H. Powers, Biomarkers and Surrogate
Endpoints in Clinical Trials, 31 STAT. MED. 2973 (2012).
79
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might otherwise not be approvable under a more rigorous application of
standards for safety and efficacy. But although it might not be commercially
feasible to require that clinical trials continue for many years, the lack of
data on clinical endpoints is a significant gap in the information base for
determining appropriate clinical use of these products, especially since
many surrogate endpoints are eventually found to be poor predictors of
clinical outcomes. 85
Payer data on clinical outcomes can provide a valuable and costeffective supplement to the limited data available from clinical trials in
these circumstances. A recent example that illustrates the potential for payer
clinical data to show the long-term value of prophylactic treatment is a
study of the pre-exposure prophylactic use (known as PrEP) of antiretroviral drugs using data from Kaiser-Permanente in San Francisco. 86 In
that study, not a single person using PrEP was infected with HIV. 87 This
study is notable because payer data confirmed that a potentially costly
treatment is valuable, rather than indicating that a costly product should be
used more sparingly. 88 When payers may be on the hook for more costly
future medical care, they may benefit financially from more extensive use
of prophylactic treatment that forestalls the need for that future care. 89
5. Personalized medicine
Personalized medicine, also known as precision medicine and frequently
touted as the future of medicine, 90 takes the idea of comparative
85

See T. R. Fleming & D. L. DeMets, Surrogate End Points in Clinical Trials: Are We
Being Misled?, 125 ANN. INTERN. MED. 605 (1996); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EVALUATION
OF BIOMARKERS, supra note 83, at 45–52.
86
Jonathan E. Volk et al., No New HIV Infections With Increasing Use of HIV
Preexposure Prophylaxis in a Clinical Practice Setting, 61 CLIN. INFECT. DIS. 1601 (2015);
Carlos F Cáceres et al., The Promises and Challenges of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis as Part
of the Emerging Paradigm of Combination HIV Prevention, 18 J. INT. AIDS SOC. (2015).
87
Volk et al., supra note 86.
88
Id. The wholesale acquisition cost of Truvada for PrEP is around $1,300 per month.
David Heitz, Insurers and Medicaid Cover It. So What’s Behind the Slow Adoption of
Truvada PrEP?, HEALTHLINE (May 8, 2014), http://www.healthline.com/health-news/hivprevention-truvada-prep-covered-by-most-insurers-050814 (last visited February 11,
2016).
89
See James F. Fries et al., Reducing Health Care Costs by Reducing the Need and
Demand for Medical Services, 329 N. ENGL. J. MED. 321 (1993) (making the case for costsavings through preventive care); but see Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care
Save Money? Health Economics and the Presidential Candidates, 358 N. ENGL. J. MED.
661 (2008) (noting that some preventive measures save money while others are costly).
90
See Barbara J. Evans, What Will It Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of
Pharmacogenomics, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753 (2006); Geoffrey S. Ginsburg & Jeanette J.
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effectiveness research to the individual or small-group level. Personalized
medicine focuses on providing “the right patient with the right drug at the
right dose at the right time.” 91 It responds to the inherent variation among
patients, or among groups, by linking that biological variation to differences
in the most effective and efficient treatment. 92 An early success story for
personalized medicine is the use of a test to identify those patients that
could benefit from the breast-cancer drug Herceptin, a drug that is effective
only against tumors that overexpress a particular gene named HER2/neu. 93
A simple genetic test can measure whether a patient’s tumor overexpresses
the gene, allowing providers to give the drug only to patients with tumors
that are likely to respond to it, while sparing other patients from exposure to
unnecessary side effects. 94 Personalized medicine may also answer other
kinds of questions, such as the appropriate dose of a drug based on patient
sex, weight, and genetic makeup 95 or which patients might benefit more or
less from the availability of an inpatient hospital bed. 96 Research is
underway to explore more complex and sophisticated personalized
medicine implementations. 97
A key piece of this research is the use and understanding of genomic
data and biomarkers. 98 An individual’s genome—the sum of his or her
McCarthy, Personalized Medicine: Revolutionizing Drug Discovery and Patient Care, 19
TRENDS BIOTECHNOL. 491 (2001); Rachel Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving
the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. __, (forthcoming 2016),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2596875.
91
Food & Drug Admin., Personalized Medicine, http://www.fda.gov/scienceresearch/
specialtopics/personalizedmedicine/default.htm (Jan. 30, 2015).
92
Id.
93
Isaac S. Chan & Geoffrey S. Ginsburg, Personalized Medicine: Progress and
Promise, 12 ANNU. REV. GENOMICS HUM. GENET. 217 (2011).
94
Id.
95
For example, consider the voluminous literature on dosing considerations for the
blood thinner warfarin based not only on physical patient characteristics but also on which
versions of drug-metabolizing enzymes the patient’s genes encode. See, e.g., J.L. Anderson
et al., Randomized trial of genotype-guided versus standard warfarin dosing in patients
initiating oral anticoagulation. 116 CIRCULATION 2563, 2563–70 (2007); Y. Caraco, S.
Blotnick, & M. Muszkat, CYP2C9 Genotype-Guided Warfarin Prescribing Enhances the
Efficacy and Safety of Anticoagulation: A Prospective Randomized Controlled Study. 2008
CLIN. PHARMACOL. THER. 460, 460–70; www.warfarindosing.org.
96
I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal And Ethical Concerns That Arise From Using
Complex Predictive Analytics In Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1139 (2014).
97
See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 419
(2015) (discussing complex and opaque medical algorithms).
98
A biomarker is a measurable characteristic that indicates a biological state within the
body. Kyle Strimbu & Jorge A. Tavel, What Are Biomarkers?, 5 CURR. OPIN. HIV AIDS
463 (2010).
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genetic information—represents a tremendous amount of biological
variability, including how fast the individual may metabolize certain drugs 99
and how likely the individual is to develop a certain type of cancer. 100 Aside
from a patient’s own genetic information, the genetics of viruses, bacteria,
and cancerous tumors can inform the treatment of related diseases. 101 Other
biomarkers, like blood-sugar level, the amount of prostate-specific antigen,
or the previously mentioned overexpression of HER2 by a tumor, can
similarly be used to direct treatment (for diabetes, prostate cancer, and
breast cancer, respectively).
Payers have an opportunity to use their data to contribute to
personalized medicine research. They have demographic and health
information about patients, including information about treatments and
outcomes. Optum, for example, is involved in developing predictive
analytics technology to identify high-risk patients based on a combination
of administrative claims data and real-time clinical data from multiple
sources. 102 These data may reveal patterns of which drugs or treatments
work best for which patients, and which patients might be best off avoiding
treatment altogether in particular circumstances. Payers may have direct
access to tissue samples (or analyses of those samples) to determine
biomarker, genetic, and genomic status; if they do not, they may be well
positioned to collaborate with other researchers to link health records to
tissue samples. 103 In fact, payers are important participants in the eMERGE
network, further discussed below. 104
The incentives of payers to perform personalized medicine research may
offer a useful counterweight to the incentives of the drug companies that
have become the key drivers of personalized medicine. 105 For drug
99

See Chan & Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 227 (2011) (describing the use of genetic
analysis of two genes, CYP2C9 and VKORC1, to predict metabolization rate of the blood
thinner warfarin and prospectively adjust dosage accordingly).
100
See Y Miki et al., A Strong Candidate for the Breast and Ovarian Cancer
Susceptibility Gene BRCA1, 266 SCIENCE 66 (1994) (identifying the BRCA1 gene, linked
to breast and ovarian cancer); Myriad, BRACANALYSIS, https://www.myriad.com/productsservices/hereditary-cancers/bracanalysis/ (describing commercially available test for breast
and ovarian cancer susceptibility based on genetic analysis of the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes).
101
Chan & Ginsburg, supra note 93.
102
Optum, Improved Predictive Analytics Better Identify High-Risk Patients, HEALTH
CARE CONVERSAT., http://healthcare-conversation.com/2015/06/08/improved-predictiveanalytics-better-identify-high-risk-patients/ (June 8, 2015).
103
The eMERGE network, discussed infra in Part II.B.3, aims to facilitate this linking
practice.
104
See Part II.B.3. infra.
105
See Chan & Ginsburg, supra note 93 (describing pharmaceutical company
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companies, personalized medicine presents a tradeoff between more reliable
treatment and smaller market size. If research shows that a particular drug
only works for a third of people taking it, and provides a mechanism for
identifying those patients, the other two thirds will no longer use the
product, and sales will decline. 106 If the company can market a new,
targeted drug, and potentially a companion diagnostic, it may be able to
charge a higher price for a drug that is more likely to be effective in its
targeted group. For payers, on the other hand, broader implementation of
personalized medicine could improve healthcare quality and reduce costs. A
payer, for example, might save costs by demonstrating that two-thirds of
patients currently taking an expensive drug would be better off taking an
older generic drug or other less expensive treatment—or no treatment at
all. 107 Of course, both drug companies and payers face the risk that
observational studies will not yield the results that are best for their bottom
lines. But financial incentives are nonetheless likely to inform the research
questions that they pursue, and perhaps to influence their analysis of results
and their decisions about what results merit publication. The participation of
both drug companies and payers as innovators in the field of personalized
medicine is thus likely to yield a more balanced and complete picture than
would emerge if the field were dominated by the drug companies.
D. Incentives for innovation
Although payers are in a good position to play a larger role in healthcare
innovation, their incentives to invest in innovation are constrained by a
number of economic and regulatory features of the healthcare market. First,
some quirks of health-care markets and tax law directly reduce incentives.
Second, because payers typically do not directly control care, they may fail
to realize the full cost saving benefits from their innovation. Third,
development of companion diagnostics for drugs). This is not to argue that insurer
incentives are perfect, as discussed below. Patients and payers may have different views as
to acceptable money-for-health tradeoffs. Moreover, patients can shift between payers over
time, giving current payers an incentive to postpone costly treatment to shift the cost to
another payer; this happens most clearly as patients age into Medicare and leave private
payers.
106
Firms may have ways to recoup that loss. For example, it may be possible to patent
a diagnostic device to guide the choice of treatment, allowing the firm to charge higher
prices for personalized medicine. In some cases the identification of a subgroup that
benefits from a drug may lead to approval of a drug that would otherwise present an
unacceptable balance of safety and efficacy in an undifferentiated patient population.
107
The opposite could, of course, also be true; a diagnostic test might reveal that an
older, cheaper drug is unsuitable for a subsection of the patient population, who might then
need to take a more expensive newer drug.
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intellectual property incentives are less available for the innovation
opportunities available to payers than they are for otherkinds of innovation
such as new products.
1. Market quirks and tax preferences
Cost sensitivity should motivate payers to invest in developing or
identifying more cost-effective treatments. However, the U.S. market for
health care and insurance has complexities and idiosyncracies that blur
these incentives. 108 Four features particularly dampen the cost-sensitivity of
payers: muted competition, passed-on costs, tax subsidies, and medical loss
ratios.
First, payers frequently face muted competition due to industry
consolidation, status-quo bias, and product opacity. The industry is highly
consolidated, which gives payers some power to dictate the terms of their
coverage and the rates they charge. 109 Status quo bias further weakens
competition, because employers and individuals have a tendency to stick
with the payer they currently use. 110 Finally, product opacity may also
reduce competition among insurance products. 111 While these factors
108

The U.S. health-care market is the subject of a vast scholarly literature that we do
not try to summarize or augment here. Instead, we merely highlight a few features of the
market that may decrease incentives for payers to innovate.
109
LEEMORE DAFNY ET AL., PAYING A PREMIUM ON YOUR PREMIUM? CONSOLIDATION
IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3 (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper 15434, October 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15434;
MARIKA CABRAL ET AL., DOES PRIVATIZED HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFIT PATIENTS OR
PRODUCERS? EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper 20470, September 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w20470 (finding that concentrated payer markets led to a marked decrease in how
much Medicare Advantage premium supports (public funds provided to lower premiums)
actually decreased premiums paid by patients).
110
Benjamin R. Handel, Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets:
When Nudging Hurts, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2643 (2013) (documenting plan inertia at a
large firm).
111
Although the Affordable Care Act has drastically increased the transparency of
insurance plans, exactly what services and products are covered by a plan remain
challenging to discern and compare, especially for individual purchasers. See, e.g., JEFFREY
R. KLING ET AL., COMPARISON FRICTION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE
DRUG PLANS (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17410 (finding low information access in choosing Medicare
Part D plans); cf, SAURABH BHARGAVA ET AL., DO INDIVIDUALS MAKE SENSIBLE HEALTH
INSURANCE DECISIONS? EVIDENCE FROM A MENU WITH DOMINATED OPTIONS 4 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2015), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w21160
(describing substantial numbers of employees choosing strictly inferior health plans and
attributing this choice to inability to understand plan options).
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interact in complex ways far beyond the scope of this Article, they may
combine to decrease competitive pressure on payers to innovate to lower
costs. 112
Second, the combination of weak market competition and weak
oversight of price increases by insurance regulators allow payers to pass on
increased costs to their customers with relative ease through increased
premiums, 113 although the Affordable Care Act has introduced some limits
on the ability of payers to raise premiums in a deliberate attempt to increase
cost sensitivity. 114
Third, tax subsidies for health insurance have dampened incentives for
frugality on the demand side of healthcare. Health insurance premiums paid
by an employer are both fully deductible by the employer as a business
expense and also excluded from the employee’s taxable income. 115 In this
system the government shares the costs of healthcare, diminishing the
interest of patients and their employers in cost-lowering innovation and
making it easier for insurers to pass rising costs along to them in the form of
higher premiums.
Fourth and finally, the complex dynamics of the Affordable Care Act’s
medical loss ratio (MLR) provisions may reduce incentives for costlowering innovation. Under those provisions, payers must pay 85 cents in
112

The exact mechanics of decreased competition, and its precise effects on innovation
incentives, are complex and beyond the scope of this Article or, indeed, our expertise. For
instance, decreased competition may decrease the need for intellectual property protection,
if competitors are not seeking to appropriate innovations for themselves. Opacity could
potentially cut in both directions; it may decrease competition, but may also allow payers
to shield potentially controversial cost-cutting innovations from public scrutiny. Teasing
out the full effects of these market features requires substantial further study.
113
See NAIC Health Insurance and Managed Care (B) Committee, Rate Review White
Paper (June 27, 2012), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_related_wp_rate_
review.pdf.
114
See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Notice 2015-16: Section 4980I — Excise Tax
on High Cost Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage (2015), available at
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-15-16.pdf (instituting the so-called “Cadillac Tax” of 40% on
plans with very high premiums). .
115
The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated value of this tax
expenditure in 2014 at $143 billion. See ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, prepared for the House Committee on Ways and Means and the
Senate Committee on Finance by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Aug. 5,
2014), at 31 (Table I), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4663.
The Congressional Budget Office arrived at a higher estimate of $250 billion that includes
the cost to the government of tax preferences for employee contributions to health
insurance premiums. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE
DEFICIT: 2014-2023 (Nov. 2013) at 243-249, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/44715-OptionsForReducingDeficit-3.pdf.
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medical expenses for each dollar received in premiums. 116 This sets a
ceiling on the increase in profits to be gained by lowering costs; it can be no
higher than 15% minus administrative expenses. While countervailing
factors exist in the MLR regime—increased efficiency may offset other
rising costs, and quality improvement research counts as part of the
“medical expense” 85%—on the margin, this cap may reduce profit-based
incentives for innovation. Overall, these features of the health market likely
combine to lower incentives to innovate toward efficiency. The marginal
incentive for frugal innovation diminishes to the extent that payers are able
to pass on cost increases to employers and patients.
2. Challenges implementing innovation
Payer incentives to innovate are further mediated by the reality that
many payers do not actually provide care. For payers to benefit from their
innovations around quality, efficiency, and medical targeting, health care
providers must actually adopt those innovations. Payers must therefore
influence providers to implement changes. In a fee-for-service system,
health care providers face perverse incentives to use more and costlier
treatments, thereby increasing their own remuneration. Thus, at least some
provider incentives are in serious tension with the goals of frugal payer
innovation. 117 Integrated health systems, which both provide and pay for
care, may find it easier to control the behavior of providers.
Traditional payers’ options for influencing caregiver behavior range
from direct procedure-setting to collaborative knowledge-sharing. Payers
can use utilization review and reimbursement tiering to guide physician
behavior, though these practices have had a contentious history. 118 Payers
116

Small payers (fewer than 100 subscribers) must meet a MLR threshold of 80%.
ACA § 1001. For a summary of this requirement, see Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Medical Loss
Ratio Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA): Issues
for Congress (2014), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42735.pdf.
117
This problem is not unique to health insurers, and indeed may be seen as just
another manifestation of principal-agent conflicts. Nonetheless, we mention it here because
it potentially decreases the incentive for insurers to innovate and because it may increase
their incentive to collaborate with providers.
118
The principal mechanism of relatively direct payer control over physician decisions
has long been utilization review, where insurers—and especially managed care
organizations—review decisions for medical appropriateness to decide whether to pay for
the care; review could be prospective or retrospective. Substantial scholarship has focused
on the impact of utilization review. Among many others, see, e.g., Paul J. Feldstein et al.,
Private Cost Containment. The Effects of Utilization Review Programs on Health Care Use
and Expenditures., 318 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1310 (1988); Thomas M. Wickizer, The Effect of
Utilization Review on Hospital Use and Expenditures: A Review of the Literature and an
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can also influence provider behavior less directly by, for example,
publishing their results and working to establish best practices, which can
include clinical guidelines or “critical pathways,” reflecting treatment
patterns that are both effective and efficient. 119 Treatment pathways are
most frequently developed by expert committees—typically well-known
physicians—relying on published literature. 120 Payers may influence these
committees by contributing their studies to the published literature. Payers
may be more effective in influencing clinical practice when they collaborate
with influential clinicians to conduct and publish observational studies,
before providing them to expert communities that can then establish
standards of care. Such collaborations are a feature of the PCORnet and
eMERGE networks. But to the extent that providers resist following new
clinical guidelines, the benefit of the innovation is diminished. 121
Payers can also try to align provider incentives with cost-saving goals
by using financial incentives or risk-sharing. If providers are compensated
on a fee-for-service basis, increased treatment costs mean increased
provider compensation, making it difficult to motivate providers to pursue
efficiency. This is the subject of a large literature; we note here only that to
the extent that incentives are successfully aligned, providers have greater
incentives to adopt payer innovations, especially frugal innovation. This
should increase the benefit to payers of developing such innovations, and
thus the likelihood that they will make the necessary investments.
This may be why integrated providers such as Kaiser Permanente have
been more active participants in payer innovation than traditional insurers.
It may be easier to implement cost-saving innovations through caregivers
Update on Recent Findings, 47 MED. CARE RES. REV. 327 (1990). However, managed care
and utilization review prompted significant backlash around the turn of the millennium.
See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 J.
HEALTH POLIT. POL’Y LAW 1115 (1999); David Mechanic, The Managed Care Backlash:
Perceptions and Rhetoric in Health Care Policy and the Potential for Health Care Reform,
79 MILBANK Q. 35 (2001).
119
See, e.g., Nathan R. Every et al., Critical Pathways: A Review, 101 CIRCULATION
461 (2000).
120
See, e.g., P4 Pathways, Protocol Development, https://www.p4pathways.com/go/
p4pathways/program/services/pathway-development.htm
(describing
a
protocoldevelopment steering committee comprising “locally based academic and community
oncologists to ensure pathways reflect both rigorous evidence-based medicine and the
clinical expertise in that region”).
121
See, e.g., Rainer Blaser et al., Improving Pathway Compliance and Clinician
Performance by Using Information Technology, 76 INT. J. MED. INF. 151 (2007). For an
example of a compliance-monitoring schema, see P4 Pathways, Compliance Monitoring,
https://www.p4pathways.com/go/p4pathways/program/services/compliancemonitoring.htm.
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who are salaried employees with nothing to gain from the provision of
costly and excessive care. The Affordable Care Act aims to achieve similar
alignment of incentives for frugality through Accountable Care
Organizations, coordinated groups of physicians, hospitals, and other
providers. 122 Among other benefits, these structures allow physicians to
share in the financial benefits of frugal care, shifting their incentives from
those of traditional fee-for-service. 123 More broadly, the Affordable Care
Act aims to shift a substantial fraction of care aware from fee-for-service
towards value-based payments or other frugality-focused payment models,
which should further align the incentives of payers and providers and enable
smoother adoption of demand-side innovation. 124
Finally, payers could influence the behavior of providers by using data
to influence FDA regulatory decisions. They might, for example, use their
data to reveal risks to FDA that it should study through the Sentinel System,
perhaps leading to future warnings or even withdrawal of product
approvals. These regulatory moves might have a greater impact on the
behavior of caregivers than the exhortations of payers.
3. Intellectual property incentives
Intellectual property raises a final set of questions about payer
incentives. Standard intellectual property incentives for innovation are
typically geared toward the producers of new products, although high prices
for patent-protected products may have the incidental benefit of motivating
payers to invest in learning how to use these products more sparingly. More
fundamentally, the excludability at the center of intellectual property is not
a viable option for the type of payer innovations discussed above. 125 But
other incentives and subsidies for payer innovation are available and in use
to promote payer innovation.
In a familiar story, intellectual property provides legal excludability to
122

See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Accountable Care Organizations,
http://cms.gov/aco (Jan. 6, 2015).
123
Id.
124
See Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals — HHS Efforts to
Improve U.S. Health Care, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 897 (2015) (setting goal of 30% of
traditional fee-for-service payments to alternative payment models by the end of 2016, and
50% by the end of 2018).
125
See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits
of Patents, 112 YALE L.J. 1923–41 (2013) (describing how patents are ineffective at
protecting inventions that are hard to exclude others from using, and describing the specific
examples of negative information about drugs, positive information about health-enhancing
lifestyle interventions, and health-care quality initiatives).
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solve the public goods problem that would otherwise prevent innovators
from capturing the full value of their investments. By allowing innovators
to exclude competitors from using their information goods, intellectual
property permits them to raise prices, thereby increasing ex ante incentives
to innovate. The forms of payer innovation considered above are pure
information goods; there is typically no new physical product that the payer
can sell associated with the knowledge gained from observational studies of
patient health records, for example. 126 But intellectual property is a poor fit
for appropriating and monetizing the value of this knowledge; secrecy is
ineffective and inappropriate, and patents are largely unavailable. 127
The first and most obvious way to appropriate an information good is to
keep it secret; if others do not have the information, they cannot use it. This
strategy is ill suited to payer medical information, because payers must at a
minimum share the information with doctors and other caregivers before
they can put it to use in a clinical setting. Moreover, caregivers are required
to obtain informed consent for medical treatment, which may require further
disclosure of the information to patients. Broader disclosure may be
necessary to bring about a change in the standard of care. For example, if
payer studies indicate that caregivers should not continue to provide a form
of treatment that is considered the standard of care in the medical
community, caregivers may fear potential malpractice liability for
withholding the treatment. 128 Widespread disclosure of the study results
may therefore be necessary to facilitate clinical implementation of changes
in the standard of care. Secrecy may thus be a serious obstacle to effective
use of payer innovations.
Patents on comparative effectiveness research results or personalized
126

The patent on the relevant drug—and the higher prices it enables—provide a
different incentive, discussed below at note 133 and accompanying text.
127
The third major form of exclusivity in the medical world is FDA-mediated
regulatory exclusivity, whereby FDA refuses to approve competitor products, or to allow
competitors to use the innovator’s regulatory data submissions, for a certain period of time
to give the first-to-be-approved product a period of lucrative exclusivity. Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 345 (2007). This form of exclusivity is inapplicable here.
128
Under medical malpractice law, doctors and other medical professionals may be
liable for negligently injuring patients; demonstrating that the care provided was within the
relevant standard of care serves as a defense against malpractice liability. John C. Drapp
III, The National Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Actions: Does Small Area
Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 95, 96–100 (2002).
Accordingly, doctors have an incentive to follow the current standard of care to avoid
liability. If payers aim to guide physician behavior into providing better forms of care—
whether more cost effective or more personally effective—demonstrating that the preferred
care is a new or developing standard is an important part of that process.
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medicine information are likely unavailable, unenforceable, and impractical.
Judicial limitations on what sorts of inventions constitute patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 cast considerable doubt on the patent
eligibility of algorithms for selecting medical treatments for patients. 129
Standard patent law rules about prior art are also likely to prevent the
patenting of the treatment options themselves. Because observational
studies of health outcomes necessarily involve treatments that are already a
part of current practice, those treatments could not be patented because they
are already in public use and on sale. 130 Even if these innovations were
patentable, the patents might be difficult to enforce for at least three
reasons: first, it would be difficult to observe and police infringing behavior
in light of the privacy of health records; 131 second, medical practitioners
practicing medical activities have a statutory exemption from patent
infringement remedies; 132 and third, suing doctors to prevent them from
practicing medicine more effectively might create a public relations
problem for a healthcare payer
Although intellectual property does not provide the same direct
incentives for medical innovation by payers that it provides for product
sellers, it may provide an important indirect motivation for payers by
increasing the costs they incur in covering patented products. When Kaiser
Permanente collaborated with FDA to study the cardiac side effects of
Vioxx, payers were collectively paying $2.5 billion per year for Vioxx,
creating a conspicuous opportunity to cut costs by reducing the use of
129

See Mayo Collaborative v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 10 (2012) (holding a
diagnostic method patent involving customizing patient dosages unpatentable subject
matter as preempting a law of nature); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347
(2014) (holding unpatentable a financial method patent and clarifying that abstract
inventions like algorithms are not made patentable by implementing them on a generalpurpose computer); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics,
Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341 (2013) (analyzing
Prometheus in the context of medical algorithms); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need
Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015).
130
Sections 102 and 103 require that inventions be new and nonobvious, respectively,
to be patentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. If particular treatments are in use and are known to
be medically useful, innovation in comparative effectiveness research demonstrating their
relative efficacy may be difficult to bring past the §§ 102/103 bars.
131
See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 125, at 1938–40 (describing the difficulty in
enforcing health-care quality patents). Broader availability of health data, such as access to
EHRs, could ease enforcement concerns, though HIPAA limitations may restrict such
access. Even with more available data, enforcement still faces challenges. See id.
132
Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), medical practitioners and related health care entities are
not liable for infringement for performing any “medical or surgical procedure on a body,”
not including the use of patented drugs or biotechnological processes.
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Vioxx. 133 Payers may be less interested in studying the effects of less costly
treatments that are already off patent, except in comparative effectiveness
studies that offer the prospect of lowering costs incurred for coverage of a
higher-priced alternative. In this indirect sense, the law of intellectual
property is likely to structure the incentives of payers towards more scrutiny
of the clinical benefits of patented treatments.
Despite these gaps in incentives, some payers are already making
notable efforts to advance the use of payer data for medical innovation. We
posit that at least three reasons why some level of innovation even without
traditional intellectual property incentives. First, as we noted above, for
innovation related to costly patent-protected treatment, high costs create an
incentive to reduce costs. Second, observational studies are relatively cheap,
especially as compared to expensive clinical trials. Third, there are a variety
of government initiatives under way that are partnering with payers and
helping them to overcome obstacles and kickstart their own research. In the
next Parts we discuss challenges in this research and explore how
government policies help payers overcome those challenges.
II. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
The use of payer data for innovation presents substantial technical
challenges. 134 Some challenges involving the storage and analysis of data
are not unique to healthcare and therefore benefit from overall
improvements in information technology. 135 Special concerns in the
healthcare field revolve around data availability, data quality, data
assembly, and data interoperability. The federal government has provided a
substantial assist to payer innovation through legislation and agency
initiatives targeting these challenges.
133

Barbara Martinez et al., Merck Pulls Vioxx Off Market After Link to Heart
Problems, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB109654671320932405.
134
For an overview, see Niels Peek et al., Technical Challenges for Big Data in
Biomedicine and Health: Data Sources, Infrastructure, and Analytics, 9 YEARB. MED.
INFORM. 42 (2014).
135
For instance, natural language processing of electronic health records—determining
what doctors mean when they write narratives—is a very challenging task, but natural
language processing in health records builds off of extensive natural language processing
efforts in other fields. See, e.g., Prakash M. Nadkarni et al., Natural Language Processing:
An Introduction, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC. 544 (2011) (describing natural language
processing and how generalist efforts might be applicable to health informatics issues);
Lucila Ohno-Machado, Realizing the Full Potential of Electronic Health Records: The
Role of Natural Language Processing, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC. 539 (2011)
(introducing a special issue on the topic).
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A. Making data useful for research
First, data must be acquired and assembled. As discussed above, payers
have direct access to some data, principally administrative claims data and
prescription data, and may have indirect access to hospital
admissions/releases, laboratory testing data, and provider records of clinical
care. 136 It takes time, money, and technical expertise to bring these data
together, link them by patient and demographic information, and structure
the data to permit meaningful analyses. 137 Even when firms have access to
data from different sources, the fragmented nature of the health-care system
means that those different sources will cover different populations of
patients. For example, although Optum’s Data Warehouse has health data
for over 150 million unique patients, it has the combination of claims,
prescription, and clinical records for fewer than three percent of those
patients. 138
For some studies, it is necessary to assemble comprehensive data not
only across different patients in a population, but also across different
periods in the lives of particular patients. 139 Longitudinal data—that is, data
that follow patients over long periods of time—are useful for measuring
preventive treatments, long-term drug effects, interactions between
treatments, and other important medical questions. 140 But the records of any
one payer frequently only cover a relatively limited span of a patient’s life.
136

See supra Part I.A. Some particularly notable efforts include Optum Labs’ Data
Warehouse and IBM’s Watson Health, which recently acquired Truven Analytics and has
at least some form of data for approximately 300 million patients. See Optum, Data,
https://www.optum.com/life-sciences/data.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2016) (describing
Optum’s Data Warehouse); IBM, Press Release: IBM Watson Health Announces Plans to
Acquire Truven Health Analytics for $2.6B, Extending Its Leadership in Value-Based Care
Solutions, http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/49132.wss (Feb. 18, 2016).
137
See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Sustainable Access to Data for Postmarketing Medical
Product Safety Surveillance under the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 24 HEALTH MATRIX
11, 14 (2014).
138
Optum, Optum Research Data Assets, 2 (2015), https://www.optum.com/lifesciences/data.html (click link for “U.S. core data assets at the bottom of the page) (last
visited Feb. 23, 2016) (listing cumulative population counts through 2014).
139
See, e.g., Optum, Better Predictive Modeling Requires Bigger, More Varied,
Higher Quality Data Sets, HEALTH CARE CONVERSATATION, http://healthcareconversation.com/2015/06/22/better-predictive-modeling-requires-bigger-more-variedhigher-quality-data-sets/ (June 22, 2015) (describing the advantage of larger and more
varied datasets in developing health predictive analytics).
140
Weber GM et al., Finding the Missing Link for Big Biomedical Data, 311 J. AM.
MED. ASSOC. 2479 (2014) (discussing the need to integrate patient records from different
data sources).
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Patients frequently switch their insurance coverage, whether because they
change to a new job with a different set of payer options 141 change payers
while staying at the same job (perhaps because the employer changes its
associated payers), change plans on the individual market, or become
eligible or ineligible for Medicaid based on changing income. The largest
change comes when patients turn 65 and become eligible for Medicare. In
any of these situations, one payer stops collecting data about that patient,
and another begins. Some patients, of course, stay with the same payer for
decades; in that case the records of a single payer may provide long-term
information without the need for aggregation. But this is rare; in one large
dataset, only about 15% of patients had administrative claims data for more
than five years. 142 For most patients, assembling a longer-term record of
information may be necessary to provide useful data for long-term studies.
Some regional efforts are already trying to overcome the challenge of
fragmented data to allow caregivers to exchange patient information more
readily. One promising example, Cal INDEX, a nonprofit health
information exchange, 143 was founded in California in 2014 with seed
money from two major payers, aiming to store centralized, comprehensive
patient information for the vast majority of patients in California. 144
Providers choose whether to join the exchange, 145 and their patients
141

Approximately 48% of Americans receive health insurance through their
employers. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ (2013 data; last visited July 16, 2015)..
142
Optum, Optum Research Data Assets, supra note 138, at 3 (noting 63.1 million
patients with affiliated administrative claims data for at least 1 day, but only 9.7 million
with data for at least 60 months).
143
Health Information Exchanges are key players in the field of interoperability and
data exchange, helping enable information transfers between providers and payers.
Exchanges still face substantial challenges in implementation more than a decade after their
promotion, Robert S. Rudin et al., Usage and Effect of Health Information ExchangeA
Systematic ReviewUsage and Effect of Health Information Exchange, 161 ANN. INTERN.
MED. 803 (2014), but show benefits in the provision of care and for the eventual
interoperability of health data, Jan Walker et al., The Value of Health Care Information
Exchange and Interoperability, 24 HEALTH AFF. W5 (2005).
144
See Cal INDEX, New California Not-for-Profit to Operate Statewide, NextGeneration
Health
Information
Exchange
(August
5,
2014),
https://www.calindex.org/new-california-healthcare-exchange/ (last accessed July 16,
2015) (“Cal INDEX will securely collect and integrate clinical data from providers and
claims data from payers to create comprehensive, retrievable patient-centered records
known as longitudinal patient records (LPRs)”).
145
See Cal INDEX, Provider FAQ, https://www.calindex.org/provider-faq/. Providers
must pay fees to participate in Cal INDEX. For the first three years, patients covered by the
two funding sponsors (Blue Shield of California and Anthem Blue Cross) will be included
in Cal INDEX free of charge, and patients covered by other providers must pay
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participate unless they opt out. 146 If Cal INDEX can successfully persuade
many providers in different payer networks to participate, it may succeed in
resolving the problem of cross-provider data fragmentation, at least within
California. 147 A patient’s single longitudinal patient record will include both
clinical and administrative claims data from multiple sources even as the
patient shifts providers and payers. 148 Cal INDEX’s stated purposes are to
improve care and to increase efficiency, but it recognizes its consolidated
dataset could also be a useful resource for research. 149
Second, and related, data from different sources must be interoperable—
that is, they must be in compatible formats so they can be joined and
analyzed together. 150 There is no standard format for electronic health
records or administrative claims data, and data from different systems are
typically kept in different formats. 151 Moreover, some payers have changed
from one data system to another over time. This means that any effort to
aggregate data must translate data from one proprietary format to

subscription fees; after the initial three-year period, all providers and insurers will pay
subscription fees. Id.
146
See Cal INDEX, Opt Out, https://optout.calindex.org/OptOut/optout.html. Note that
federal law requires opting-in for particular types of sensitive information such as
substance abuse records, mental health information, and the results of an HIV test. See
infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. Thus, some types of data may remain
fragmented, even if data sources are integrated.
147
As described above, health data laws, including those on privacy, can vary from
state to state. See supra id.. Cal INDEX apparently does not currently have infrastructure to
capture patient records from other states to account for patient movement. However, other
parallel efforts exist in other jurisdictions.
148
See Cal INDEX, Provider FAQ,
https://www.calindex.org/provider-faq/
(describing a Longitudinal Patient Record as “comprehensive, retrievable, patient-centered
record that integrates payer and provider data over time, [initially including] payer
information (e.g., demographics, medical and Rx information)[, later adding providersupplied] clinical information from electronic medical records . . . and facility admission,
discharge and transfer . . . systems (as examples).”
149
See Cal INDEX, Value of Cal INDEX, https://www.calindex.org/value-of-calindex/ (noting that Cal INDEX can “benefit public health by providing de-identified data
that can be used for medical research.”)
150
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, CONNECTING HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A SHARED NATIONWIDE
INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP (DRAFT) 10–11 (2015), http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/
files/nationwide-interoperability-roadmap-draft-version-1.0.pdf; see also Evans, supra note
39, at 14 (citing PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH
FORWARD 39 (2010)).
151
Id.
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another. 152 Some pieces of information may be present in one system but
not another; other information may be coded in different fashions (e.g.,
numerical versus qualitative judgments) or using different standards (e.g.,
different ranges indicated by “high” and “low”). Some of these barriers may
arise through inadvertence, but there is also evidence that some firms
providing electronic health record systems may use proprietary formats to
stymy aggregation and use of data from other systems. 153 Further
complicating the interoperability problem, as described below, data about
different kinds of conditions may be subject to different privacy regimes
because some information is especially sensitive and thus more strongly
protected by law. 154
Third, ensuring and maintaining the quality of data is difficult.155
Especially in administrative claims data, information essential to receiving
payment may be coded in ways that reflect financial incentives. 156 Because
insurance requires certain diagnoses or procedures to reimburse for
physician services, health care providers may have incentives to code those
data in marginal or inappropriate situations, leading to biased data. 157 In
addition, some health terms are inherently imprecise, such as “overweight”
or “high” blood pressure, and may carry different meanings to different
practitioners; attempting to distill imprecise categories into numerical
variables can introduce errors if not done carefully and consistently. Finally,
152

See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health,
and Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L. MED. ETHICS 56 (2013); Jan Walker et al., The Value of
Health Care Information Exchange and Interoperability, 24 HEALTH AFF W5 (2005); W.
Ed Hammond, The Making and Adoption of Health Data Standards, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1205
(2005).
153
See OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: REPORT ON HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING 11–19
(April
2015),
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf
(defining the technique of “information blocking” as “when persons or entities knowingly
and unreasonably interfere with the exchange or use of electronic health information,”
describing anecdotal and evidence of its prevalence).
154
Different legal restrictions on data are discussed in more detail below in Part III,
infra, but include the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164(A) & (E); the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008); and the
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549.
155
For an overview of quality challenges in medical data, see Sharona Hoffman &
Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L.
MED. ETHICS 56 (2013); Sharona Hoffman, Symposium, Medical Big Data and Big Data
Quality Problems, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 289 (2014).
156
See ROBERT WACHTER, THE DIGITAL DOCTOR: HOPE, HYPE, AND HARM AT THE
DAWN OF MEDICINE’S COMPUTER AGE (2015)..
157
Id.
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even with adequate care and effort, errors exist in all sources of data, and
entities using those data for analysis need to account for that error. 158
B. Assistance from federal regulatory initiatives.
Although these challenges are substantial, a number of federal
legislative and regulatory initiatives are helping to facilitate the use of
health records in research. These efforts include incentives to promote the
adoption and use of interoperable health records by caregivers and
hospitals, creation of a network of data sources for public health monitoring
of postmarket drug safety issues, and research initiatives in the areas of
comparative effectiveness studies and personalized medicine.
1. Electronic health records.
The federal government has been actively promoting the use of
electronic health records (EHRs) for well over a decade in the hope of
reducing medical errors, reducing costs, and improving the quality of
care. 159 Policy makers have also touted the potential for research use of
electronic health records as part of a “learning healthcare system” in which
caregivers continuously adapt their treatment choices in light of everexpanding knowledge about healthcare outcomes. 160
The healthcare industry has been extraordinarily slow to adopt
information technology, lagging far behind the rest of the economy. 161 For a
variety of reasons, paper records and hard copies dominated health records
well into the first decade of the 21st century. 162 President George W. Bush
called for computerizing health records in his 2004 State of the Union

158

Randomly distributed error may be accounted for by using sufficiently large
samples, though with subtler or more complex relationships, or with smaller sample sizes,
the signal can be swamped in noisy data. Systematic biases in data cannot be accounted for
with larger sample sizes.
159
See Report and Recommendations from the National Committee on Vital and
Health Statistics, Information for Health: A Strategy for Building the National Health
Information Infrastructure (2001), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/documents/NHIIReport2001/.
160
Id. at 145–160.
161
Eric G. Poon et al., Assessing the level of healthcare information technology
adoption in the United States: A snapshot, 6 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISIONMAKING (Jan. 2006), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/6/1; Gerard F. Anderson
et al., Health Care Spending and Use of Information Technology in OECD Countries, 25
HEALTH AFF. 819-831 (2006).
162
Institute of Medicine. Crossing the quality chasm: a new health system for the 21st
century (2001) [IOM Quality Chasm].
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address, 163 and followed up by creating a new Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) to pursue this goal,
with a budget of $42 million. 164 But progress remained slow.
Federal incentives to make use of electronic health records were
strengthened considerably in the Obama administration, 165 largely as a
result of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act), passed as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 166 The HITECH Act codified the
responsibilities and authority of the ONC within the Department of Health
and Human Services. 167 It charged the ONC with reviewing standards for
health information exchange, coordinating the activities of the federal
government concerning health information technology, certifying
compliance with applicable standards on a voluntary basis, publishing
reports, and disseminating financial assistance. The legislation also
established a Health IT Policy Committee 168 to make recommendations to
the ONC for implementing a nationwide health information technology
infrastructure and a Health IT Standards Committee 169 to recommend
standards, specifications and certification criteria for the exchange of health
information technology. 170 It directed the Secretary of HHS to “assist health
care providers to adopt, implement, and effectively use certified EHR
technology that allows for the electronic exchange and use of health
information” through support of a research center and regional extension
centers to provide technical assistance, disseminate best practices, and allow
for the exchange and use of information in compliance with standards. 171
And it provided $30 billion for incentive payments through Medicare and
Medicaid to reward the adoption and “meaningful use” of EHRs by
163

George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (2004), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
164
David J. Brailer, Interview: Guiding the Health Information Technology Agenda, 29
HEALTH AFF. 586-595, 588 (2010).
165
Id. (noting substantial increase in funding for ONC). The HITECH Act included
appropriations of $2 billion for the operation of the ONC and an estimated $30 billion in
Medicare and Medicaid incentive payments for physicians and hospitals that adopt and
make meaningful use of electronic health records. See Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al.,
Health Information Technology: Laying the Infrastructure for National Health Reform, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1214-19 (2010).
166
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (Feb. 17, 2009) (ARRA), Div. A, Title XIII, Div. B, Title IV [HITECH Act].
167
ARRA § 3001
168
ARRA § 3002
169
ARRA § 3003
170
ARRA Div. A Tit. I.
171
ARRA § 3012
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providers and hospitals. 172 Requirements to establish meaningful use
increase over time, and after 2015, those who fail to make meaningful use
EHRs are subject to penalties.
Use of EHRs increased significantly following the implementation of
HITECH payment incentives, 173 although this has hardly been an
unqualified success story. 174 Progress has been much slower in promoting
health information exchange among providers. A major focus of the ONC
in the years ahead is to achieve “a nationwide, interoperable health IT
infrastructure.” 175
HITECH-driven adoption of EHRs offers considerable potential benefits
for research users. EHRs provide richer and more complete information
than claims data, and are easier to aggregate for use as research data than
172

ARRA §§ 4101, 4102. See Dept. of Health & Human Serv., Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Serv., Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Modifications to the Medicare and
Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program for 2014 and Other Changes
to the EHR Incentive Program; and Health Information Technology: Revisions to the
Certified EHR Technology Definition and EHR Certification Changes Related to
Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 52910 (Sept. 4, 2014).
173
There is some debate about how much of this increase is a result of the resources
and incentives put in place by the HITECH Act. Compare C.J. Hsiao et al., Office-based
physicians are responding to incentives and assistance by adopting and using electronic
health records, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1470, 1470–77 (2013) (rapid growth in adoption and
meaningful use of basic EHR systems among US ambulatory care physicians from 20102012) and Michael F. Furukawa et al., Despite Substantial Progress in EHR Adoption,
Health Information Exchange and Patient Engagement Remain Low in Office Settings, 33
HEALTH AFF. 1672 (2014) (finding greater progress in EHR adoption than in use of
computerized health information exchange and patient engagement) with David Dranove et
al., Investment Subsidies and the Adoption of Electronic Medical Records at Hospitals,
NBER Working Paper No. 20553 (Oct. 2014), http:// www.nber.org/papers/w20553
(finding that HITECH incentives only modestly increased rate of adoption of EHRs by
hospitals).
174
A comparison of survey results in 2012 and 2015 by Accenture show a declining
share of US doctors that see EMRs and health information exchange as improving the
quality of treatment decisions, reducing medical errors, and improving health outcomes for
patients. Accenture, Doctors Survey 2015, US Report, slide 14, http://www.accenture.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/public-service/accenture-doctors-survey-2015-usinfographic.pdf. For a narrative account of the impact of electronic medical records on
providers and hospitals, see WACHTER, supra note 156.
175
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, Connecting
Health and Care for the Nation: A 10-Year Vision to Achieve an Interoperable Health IT
Infrastructure
(2014),
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
ONC10yearInteroperabilityConceptPaper.pdf; Office of the National Coordinator for
Health Information Technology, Connecting Health and Care for the Nation: A Shared
Nationwide Interoperability Roadmap (Draft Version 1.0 April 2015) (hereinafter
Interoperability
Roadmap),
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/nationwideinteroperability-roadmap-draft-version-1.0.pdf
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the paper records used by providers in the past. Although lack of
interoperability is an ongoing problem, ONC is working to promote the
development of interoperable EHR products that allow providers to share
and access a common clinical data set according to common technical
standards across a nationwide network. 176 The networks and infrastructure
that promote information exchange in the context of clinical care will also
facilitate access and aggregation by researchers, as ONC recognizes. 177
Indeed, for research purposes it may be possible to achieve considerable
benefits without nationwide interoperability by using the records of a single
large provider. 178 Data quality may prove to be a more persistent problem in
making research use of records that some observers claim are optimized for
(or distorted by) the purpose of justifying billing. 179
2. Regulatory use of networked data for observational studies
Payer innovators may also benefit from the infrastructure and
technology developed to support the FDA Sentinel System, a legislatively
mandated network of data sources and tools for post-market monitoring of
the safety of FDA-approved products.
A series of high-profile drug safety cases (including the Vioxx
episode) 180 provoked members of Congress to ask the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to review FDA’s organizational structure and
decision-making process for postmarket drug safety. 181 The GAO Report
was highly critical of FDA’s system of postmarket surveillance, noting that
it was underfunded 182 and relied too heavily on an unreliable system of

176

Interoperability Roadmap, supra note 175, at 13.
Id. at 18–19 (noting that interoperability will promote “a learning health system”
that improves health “by generating information and knowledge from data captured and
updated over time”).
178
E.g., the Kaiser Permanente study of the effects of Vioxx was limited to the records
of one large, integrated provider.
179
WACHTER, supra note 156, at 120 (“Much of the data in EHRs continues to be
collected for the purpose of creating a superior bill, and using this waste product of
administrative functions for clinical decision making can lead to a GIGO (garbage in,
garbage out) problem, even with fabulous analytics.”).
180
Another contemporaneous controversy involved FDA’s delay in notifying the
public of risks of suicide risks associated with the use of antidepressants by children. [cite]
181
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Report to Requesters: Drug Safety, Improvements
Needed in FDA’s Postmarket Decision-making and Oversight Process (2006).
182
Id. at 7-8 (noting that in fiscal year 2005 the FDA Office of Drug Safety had
expenditures of $26.9 million and a staff of 107, while the Office of New Drugs had
expenditures of $110.6 million and a staff of 715).
177
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adverse event reporting. 183 Although at the time FDA had started working
with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to obtain
access to data on clinical experience and patient outcomes with drugs
provided under the then-new Medicare prescription drug benefit, it was
unclear how useful those data would be for surveillance of drug safety. 184
The GAO Report concluded that “FDA will need to continue its efforts to
develop useful observational studies and to access and use additional
healthcare databases” and recommended that “Congress should consider
expanding FDA’s authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket
studies, such as clinical trials or observational studies.” 185
Around the same time FDA and the Department of Health and Human
Services asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene a committee of
experts to assess the US drug safety system and to make recommendations
to improve risk assessment, surveillance, and the safe use of drugs. 186 The
IOM Committee report embraced a “lifecycle approach to drug risk and
benefit” that would not rely exclusively on FDA and drug companies, but
would also engage the healthcare delivery system, the academic research
community, and other government agencies in an “ongoing, active
reassessment of risk and benefit” throughout the life of the product. 187 In
particular, the report recommended an overhaul of FDA’s outdated postapproval adverse event reporting system and an increase in “programs that
access and study data from large automated healthcare databases.” Noting
that preapproval clinical trials “do not provide adequate information about
the balance of risks and benefits of drugs that are used by many people for
many years,” the report recommended making more effective use of
“increasingly high-quality data and scientific capacity” of other public and
private sector institutions through “a public-private partnership with drug
sponsors, public and private insurers, for-profit and not-for-profit health
care provider organizations, consumer groups, and large pharmaceutical
companies to prioritize, plan, and organize funding for confirmatory drug
safety and efficacy studies of public health importance.” 188 The IOM report
also echoed the recommendations of the GAO Report that Congress fortify
FDA’s authorities to take a variety of regulatory actions after drug
183

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 35 (noting “data quality issues”).
185
Id. at 36
186
IOM Comm. on the Assessment of the US Drug Safety System, The Future of Drug
Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public at 2–3 (Washington DC:
National Academies Press 2007)
187
Id. at 4–5.
188
Id. at 7–8.
184
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approval. 189
The recommendations in these reports did not speak directly to the role
of payers in healthcare innovation and regulation. But by highlighting the
value of healthcare records and observational studies in the ongoing process
of systematic learning from clinical experience, they set a course that would
enlarge the role of institutions with stewardship of those records.
Congress responded to the GAO and IOM reports on drug safety by
passing the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
(FDAAA 2007), 190 a complex piece of legislation that gave FDA significant
new authorities to oversee the safety of drugs after approval. 191 This
legislation marked a significant shift in the evidentiary basis for FDA
decision-making away from sole reliance on data from premarket clinical
trials and adverse event reports submitted by drug companies 192 towards
new sources of data and expertise. 193 It directed FDA to collaborate with
“public, academic, and private entities” to obtain access to “disparate data
sources” and to “develop validated methods for the establishment of a
postmarket risk identification and analysis system to link and analyze safety
data from multiple sources.” 194 Once these methods were developed, it
directed FDA to “establish and maintain procedures for risk identification
and analysis based on electronic health data.” 195
The electronic health data that these provisions direct FDA to monitor
are for the most part in the custody of payers. Although the statute charges
FDA with the job of developing and using the system for surveillance, it
also contemplates that FDA will work in cooperation with other actors and
189

Id. at 10–12.
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
191
Particularly notable are new authorities to require a drug sponsor to conduct
postapproval studies or new clinical trials at any time after approval of a new drug
application if FDA becomes aware of new safety information, 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3); to
require labeling changes to disclose new safety information, 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4); and to
require “risk evaluation and management strategies,” which might include the use of
Medication Guides and patient package inserts or other communication with providers,
special training or certification requirements for providers that dispense the product, and
special monitoring of patients that use the product, if necessary to ensure that the benefits
of the drug outweigh its risks. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1.
192
Data from clinical trials remain necessary as part of a new drug application under
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1)(A) and 355(d)(1), (5), and (7). Sponsors also have a continuing
obligation to report adverse events.
193
For a thoughtful analysis of this shift, see Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New
Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419-524 (2010).
194
21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3).
195
21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i).
190
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institutions, and explicitly authorizes FDA to enter into contracts with
public and private entities to achieve these goals. 196 Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine how FDA could carry out its new statutory directives unless it
works with the payers who have custody of health data.
With these marching orders, FDA has been working with outside
entities, including payers, to establish its Sentinel System for monitoring the
safety of drugs. It entered into a 5-year contract with the Harvard Pilgrim
health plan to develop a pilot “mini-Sentinel” system, and recently entered
into a new contract with Harvard Pilgrim to lead the Sentinel System in
partnership with over fifty health care organizations and academic
institutions.197
Mini-Sentinel has already facilitated the development of innovative
information using payer data. In 2010, FDA launched a study of the risk of
intussusception 198 in infants receiving rotavirus vaccines after ambiguous
postmarketing studies conducted by the vaccine sponsors. 199 FDA used
Mini-Sentinel to access payer information from Aetna, Healthcore, and
Humana relating to over 1.3 million vaccine administrations. 200 Researchers
found a small but significant increase in intussusception, enough to require
labeling changes for the vaccines. 201 Although this is a success story for
Mini-Sentinel, it also highlights the challenge of this type of network:
someone must know to ask the question, and currently, the only one asking
the questions is FDA.
Sentinel is an important public health initiative to develop and utilize
new technology and data sources in a distributed network to monitor safety.
Although the purpose of the Sentinel System is to monitor drug safety, this
unique resource is currently being used for other public health purposes as
well, 202 and FDA officials have announced plans to make the Sentinel
infrastructure—though not the data themselves—available to other users in
the future as part of a national data infrastructure. 203
196

21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(v).
See Health Affairs, Health Affairs Health Policy Brief, The FDA’s Sentinel
Initiative. (June 4, 2015) [Health Affairs Sentinel Brief], http://healthaffairs.org/
healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_139.pdf
198
Intussusception is a serious medical condition in which part of the intestine folds
into another section of the intestine.
199
U.S. FDA, FDA Releases Final Study Results of a Mini-Sentinel Postlicensure
Observational Study of Rotavirus Vaccines and Intussusception (June 13, 2013), http://
www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/ucm356758.htm.
200
W. Katherine Yih et al., Intussusception Risk after Rotavirus Vaccination in U.S.
Infants, 370 N. ENGL. J. MED. 503 (2014)
201
Id.
202
Id. at 4.
203
Janet Woodcock, Another important step in FDA’s journey towards enhanced
197
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More broadly, Sentinel is also a significant research initiative that
leverages public resources, public health goals, and legal authorities to
support the development of technology that has other uses in biomedical
research. The statute explicitly calls for the development and validation of
new analytical methods. 204 More generally, it sets goals that drive the
development of new capabilities. Because this initiative looks to establish a
network of data sources, it creates new partnerships among institutions,
including payers, that might benefit from other collaborations outside the
Sentinel System. By setting ambitious goals for utilizing new technological
strategies, it identifies obstacles (such as data quality and interoperability
and privacy) and challenges participants to develop strategies to overcome
them. 205 And it engages in this research effort a set of institutions that have
a direct stake in the research, but might not otherwise have taken on such a
significant role in health R&D.
3. Government research programs
The federal government has also used its role as research sponsor to
establish new research programs that organize, subsidize, and direct
research using health records. These programs provide subsidies and
training and build networks across public, private, and academic
institutions, providing a foundation for future research.
a. Comparative effectiveness research
The Affordable Care Act (2010) authorized the establishment of the
Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to oversee and set
guidelines for comparative effectiveness research. The legislation specifies
that PCORI will be a nonprofit, nongovernmental research institute with an
initial appropriation from Congress and subsequent funding from a new fee
on health insurers until it sunsets in 2019. 206
safety through full-scale “active surveillance,” FDA Voice (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/12/another-important-step-in-fdas-journeytowards-enhanced-safety-through-full-scale-active-surveillance/.
204
21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B).
205
Health Affairs Sentinel Brief, supra note 197, at 4.
206
The choice to set up an organization outside the existing science agencies is
interesting, and likely explained by the politics of holding together a fragile coalition to
pass the Affordable Care Act in the face of industry anxiety about the likely impact on
coverage decisions and prices for their products. The House version of the ACA called for
a government entity housed within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ), which in turn is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services. The
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PCORI is governed by a 19-member board including patients,
caregivers, and representatives of hospitals, insurers and productdeveloping firms. It is distinctive in its focus on engagement with
stakeholders including clinical and patient communities to ensure the
relevance and impact of research.
The PCORI provisions of the ACA specifically target the same
technical difficulties that payers would confront in their own comparative
effectiveness research, 207 creating communities to address these difficulties
with federal funding. PCORI has awarded $100 million to establish a
national patient-centered outcomes research network, PCORnet, composed
of 11 large healthcare organization networks and 18 patient-group-based
networks, that will generate interoperable datasets to support multinetwork
studies, and it is actively funding studies.
PCORI occupies a politically precarious niche in the biomedical
innovation system. There have been repeated proposals to eliminate PCORI.
Some critics charge that it is redundant to the ongoing efforts of other
agencies. But its focus on engaging clinical caregivers and private payers in
the research distinguishes it from other more academically oriented research
programs, and perhaps offers the prospect of training and engaging a new
set of institutions that will continue their involvement in research in the
future.
The political compromises necessary to pass the ACA constrained
PCORI with the following ambiguous statutory prohibition:
The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute . . . shall not
develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year (or similar
measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s
disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost
effective or recommended. The Secretary shall not utilize such an
Senate Finance Committee version of the ACA called for a nongovernmental entity, and
that is the version that was ultimately signed into law. Kavita Patel, Health Reform’s
Tortuous Route to the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, 29:10 HEALTH AFF.
1777, 1777–82 (2010).
207
The ACA amended the Public Health Service Act to add a new section 937(f)
authorizing the Secretary of HHS to build data capacity for the conduct of comparative
effectiveness research:
The Secretary shall provide for the coordination of relevant Federal health programs to
build data capacity for comparative clinical effectiveness research, including the
development and use of clinical registries and health outcomes research data networks,
in order to develop and maintain a comprehensive, interoperable data network to
collect, link, and analyze data on outcomes and effectiveness from multiple sources,
including electronic health records.
ACA § 6301(b).
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adjusted life year (or such a similar measure) as a threshold to determine
coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII. 208

This language reflects concerns by some opponents of comparative
effectiveness research that it would lead to rationing or withholding of care
from disabled people based on assessments of government bureaucrats that
some lives are worth less than others. Some commentators read this
language broadly to prohibit consideration of cost-effectiveness in PCORIfunded research. 209 Whatever limits the statutory language imposes on
PCORI, it does not constrain other institutions outside the government.
Thus private insurers could develop their own cost-effectiveness thresholds
and use them to make coverage determinations without violating the law.
Indeed, the statute explicitly states that “Nothing in this section shall be
construed . . . to permit the Institute to mandate coverage, reimbursement,
or other policies for any public or private payer . . . .” 210
But the statute directly prohibits use of dollars-per-quality adjusted life
years as thresholds for coverage determinations under Medicare. Since
private insurers often replicate Medicare coverage determinations, the
constraints on “the Secretary” may effectively determine private sector
moves as well. These provisions may undermine the potential of PCORI
research to drive cost-savings in practice, but should not significantly
constrain its research mission.
b. Personalized medicine
Another important source of research funding that is likely to accelerate
progress in overcoming technical obstacles to payer innovation is the
National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH is, of course, the largest source of
funding for biomedical research, and an important driver of personalized
medicine research. Two NIH initiatives particularly stand out: the Precision
208

ACA § 1182, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1(e).
Professor Nicholas Bagley, while acknowledging that some legislators sought to
impose just such a limitation, reads the enacted statutory language more narrowly. In this
reading, the statute merely prevents the development or employment of a cost-effectiveness
threshold based on dollars-per-quality adjusted life years or similar measures. So long as
PCORI does not develop or employ such a threshold to establish what type of health care is
cost effective or recommended, nothing in the statutory language prevents it from
compiling, considering, and comparing costs of the treatments that it evaluates. Nicholas
Bagley, Who says PCORI can’t do cost effectiveness? The Incidental Economist (Oct. 14,
2013),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/who-says-pcori-cant-do-costeffectiveness/
210
ACA § 6301(a), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (j)(1)(A).]
209
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Medicine Initiative, and the eMERGE network.
President Obama announced the Precision Medicine Initiative in his
2015 State of the Union address. The aim of the initiative is to drive
personalized medicine forward through public-private partnerships,
including work with drug companies on cancer genomics. 211 Eventually, the
initiative aims to develop a cohort of at least one million Americans with
full genomic and health data to be used for research. The President called
for an initial $215 million in funding to drive this research. 212 Crucially, the
goals of the program included a significant focus on infrastructure for
research, including developing the cohort, creating information
management and analysis tools, and helping cement relationships between
public and private entities in the area. 213
Another particularly important NIH initiative in this area is the
eMERGE (electronic MEdical Records and GEnomics) Network, a
consortium of research institutions organized and funded by the National
Institute for Human Genome Research that brings together researchers with
wide-ranging expertise in genomics, statistics, ethics, informatics, and
clinical medicine. 214
The eMERGE Network aims to combine information from electronic
health records with genotype data from DNA biorepositories to identify
relationships between genetic variations and health outcomes and to assess
the utility of genotype information for clinical use. 215 To facilitate this
research the eMERGE network has had to address a number of issues with
legal implications, including developing standardized patient consent
language and best practices for sharing patient genetic data, and has formed
working groups to address these issues. 216 eMERGE’s sponsor, the National
Human Genome Research Institute, has a long history of sponsoring
211

See Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine,
372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 793, 793 (2015); Nat’l Inst. of Health, Near-Term Goals, http://
nihprod.cit.nih.gov/precisionmedicine/goals.htm (last updated October 13, 2015).
212
Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision
Medicine Initiative (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/
30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative.
213
Collins & Varmus, supra note 211.
214
eMERGE Network, https://emerge.mc.vanderbilt.edu/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016);
Catherine A. McCarty et al., The eMERGE Network: A Consortium of Biorepositories
Linked to Electronic Medical Records Data for Conducting Genomic Studies, 4 BMC MED.
GENOMICS 13 (2011).
215
eMERGE Network, About eMERGE, https://emerge.mc.vanderbilt.edu/aboutemerge/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
216
See Laura M. Beskow et al., Model Consent Language (2009),
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/research/clinical_research/application_process/eMerge_model_la
nguage.pdf.
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research on ethical and legal issues associated with human genome research
and incorporating best practices into research. 217
The tools and databases created by the eMERGE network have also
been used by participating institutions in collaborations outside the network,
suggesting spillover benefits in promoting further research outside the
immediate scope of sponsored activity. For instance, eMERGE researchers
developed the Phenotype KnowledgeBase, or PheKB, a collaborative
environment used to collect, validate, and share electronic algorithms for
learning about patient phenotype based on health data. 218 Similarly,
eMERGE’s model consent form can be used by any organization, including
integrated systems, collecting genomic data for future analyses. Finally,
eMERGE’s privacy-protecting data collection framework offers a pathway
for future data-collection endeavors by payers or data aggregators. 219 This
last is a particularly relevant example of the way that federal research
initiatives can facilitate payer innovation, because it bears on a large nontechnological hurdle to that innovation: privacy rules protecting patient
data.
III. LEGAL PRIVACY OBSTACLES: HIPAA AND HITECH
Privacy laws, principally the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 220 present a challenging obstacle to
the use of patient health information for research purposes.
HIPAA aimed to facilitate the flow of information for health care and
administrative purposes (such as claims processing), while protecting
patient privacy by restricting uses and disclosure for other purposes. 221 The
Department of Health and Human Services has elaborated upon these
general statutory provisions in detailed rules, 222 including a Privacy Rule223
217

See Jean E. McEwen et al., The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Program of
the National Human Genome Research Institute: Reflections on an Ongoing Experiment*,
15 ANN. REV. GENOMICS HUM. GENET. 481 (2014).
218
See PheKB, https://phekb.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
219
See Ioana Danciu et al., Secondary Use of Clinical Data: The Vanderbilt Approach,
52 J. BIOMED. INFORM. 28 (2014) (discussing data architecture and privacy-protecting
collection practices); Abel N. Kho et al., Design and Implementation of a Privacy
Preserving Electronic Health Record Linkage Tool in Chicago, J. AM. MED. INFORM.
ASSOC. ocv038 (2015) (implementing similar system to collect data in Chicago).
220
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 100 Stat. 2548 (hereinafter HIPAA).
221
See Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24
HEALTH MATRIX 65, 67-69 (describing basic architecture of privacy protection under 1996
statute).
222
Section 264 of HIPAA called for the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the
Secretary) to submit detailed recommendations to Congress with respect to the privacy of
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that sets limits on disclosure and use of “protected health information” 224 by
“covered entities” 225 and their “business associates.” 226 Health insurance
plans, providers, and health care clearinghouses are all “covered entities.”227
Business associates include anyone who, “on behalf of a covered entity,”
receives protected health information from the covered entity to perform
“legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation . . . management,
administrative, accreditation, or financial services.” 228 “Protected health
information” includes both medical and billing records. 229 The baseline rule
under HIPAA is that all use or disclosure of protected health information is
prohibited unless it is specifically allowed. 230 In addition, the Privacy Rule
requires reasonable efforts to limit uses or disclosures of protected
information to “the minimum necessary” to accomplish the intended
purpose. 231 The Privacy Rule thus creates substantial hurdles for
aggregating data from different sources, and even for internal use of data by
individually identifiable health information within twelve months of the enactment of
HIPAA, and further provided that if legislation governing privacy standards were not
enacted within three years, the Secretary “shall promulgate final regulations containing
such standards” within 42 months after the enactment of HIPAA. HIPAA, supra note 220,
§ 263.
223
45 C.F.R. Parts 160, 164.
224
The HIPAA Privacy Rule generally defines “protected health information” as
“individually identifiable health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
225
“Covered entities” is defined at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 to include a health plan, a
health care clearinghouse, or a health care provider who transmits any health information in
electronic form.
226
45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
227
45 C.F.R. § 160.102. Only providers who transmit health information in electronic
form in connection with certain transactions are “covered entities.” Id. Health care
clearinghouses are entities that engage in the data integration process described above,
changing information between different formats to facilitate its use in different
environments. 45 CFR § § 160.103, 164.500(b).
228
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (emphasis added).
229
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 defines “protected health information” as “individually
identifiable health information … that is (i) transmitted by electronic media; (ii) maintained
in electronic media; or (iii) transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.” It
broadly defines “health information” to mean “any information, including genetic
information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that (1) is created or
received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life
insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) relates to the past,
present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of
health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of
health care to an individual.”
230
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502.
231
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) This limitation does not apply to disclosures to providers
for the purposes of providing care, or various other purposes required by the statute. Id. §
164.502(b)(2).
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a covered entity, but it is limited in a number of ways that leave room for
some research use of protected information. 232
Complicating the picture, different kinds of health information are
subject to different rules. The Privacy Rule itself provides additional
protection for psychotherapy notes 233 while allowing more stringent privacy
protections under various state laws. 234 Some state statutes, for example,
provide more stringent additional protections against disclosure of
information related to HIV status and treatment. 235 Other federal statutes
provide additional protection for genetic information, 236 substance abuse
treatment records, 237 and HIV status beyond the HIPAA baseline. 238 This
232

See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502 (general rule prohibiting use or disclosure of protected
health information except as permitted or required by the Privacy Rule); 164.508 (defining
uses and disclosures for which an authorization is required);164.512 (defining uses and
disclosures for which an authorization is not required).
233
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2) (prohibiting disclosure without specific written
authorization).
234
45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(c)(2).
235
E.g., New York Public Health Law § 2783
236
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (GINA). The protections of GINA are particularly notable because of the importance
of genetic information to researchers seeking to understand the heterogenous responses of
different patients to healthcare interventions. GINA prohibits discrimination in health
insurance coverage based on an individual’s genetic information. It also states that genetic
information is health information under HIPAA contains new privacy protections for
genetic information and prohibits insurers from using or disclosing genetic information for
underwriting purposes. Id. § 105. While GINA does not impose specific restrictions on use
or disclosure of genetic information for research purposes, insurers are prohibited from
requiring patients to undergo genetic testing. Id. § 101(b). In addition, at least one
commentator has expressed concern that doctors will keep genetic information out of
insurer-accessible medical records to prevent GINA-prohibited discrimination. Eric A.
Feldman, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA): Public Policy and
Medical Practice in the Age of Personalized Medicine, 27 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 743, 745
(2012).
237
Under 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a), “Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or
treatment of any patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of any
program or activity relating to substance abuse education, prevention, training, treatment,
rehabilitation, or research, which is conducted, regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted
by any department or agency of the United States shall, . . . be confidential and be
disclosed only for the purposes and under the circumstances expressly authorized under
subsection (b) of this section.” The only statutory exception is for a “bona fide medical
emergency,” id. § 290dd-2(b)(2)(A), but regulations provide that information can be shared
between personnel within a program or its direct administrative supervisor for substance
abuse treatment purposes. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(3). Less protective state laws are preempted,
but more protective state laws are not. 42 C.F.R. § 2.20.
238
For a helpful overview, see Timothy S. Jost, Constraints on Sharing Mental Health
and Substance-Use Treatment Information Imposed by Federal and State Medical Records
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uneven landscape of privacy restrictions further complicates the challenge
of assembling broad, comprehensive, longitudinal health records. Different
types of health information are fragmented into different privacy siloes, and
the legal privacy protections change as patients move between states or
develop new medical conditions.
The Privacy Rule nonetheless allows some room for innovators to use
health data. Some uses of protected health information are generally
permitted, while specific waiver and authorization provisions enable
normally prohibited uses. Moreover, the HITECH Act of 2009 has modified
HIPAA to reshape—and hopefully, to reduce—some hurdles to innovation.
A. Normally permitted uses
The wording of the Privacy Rule creates considerable confusion about
the extent to which the study of healthcare records to improve future patient
care qualifies for the more favorable treatment for “health care operations”
rather than falling into the less favored category of “research.” The Privacy
Rule permits a covered entity to use or disclose protected health information
“for treatment, payment or health care operations,” 239 so long as it makes
“reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to the minimum
necessary to accomplish the intended purpose.” 240 Although the Rule
explicitly allows use of protected health information for “quality assessment
and improvement activities, including outcomes evaluation and
development of clinical guidelines,” such studies may not have the primary
purpose of “obtaining [] generalizable knowledge.” 241 These provisions are
tough to reconcile, since it would be irresponsible to develop clinical
guidelines on the basis of anything short of generalizable knowledge. 242 At
Privacy Laws in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON CROSSING THE QUALITY
CHASM: ADAPTATION TO MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTIVE DISORDERS (Washington DC:
National Academies Press 2006).
239
45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a).
240
164.502(b). The definitions set forth in the Privacy Rule make it clear that the
exception for “health care operations” does not cover “research.” “Health care operations”
is defined to include “conducting quality assessment and improvement activities, including
outcomes evaluation and development of clinical guidelines, provided that the obtaining of
generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies resulting from such
activities.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
241
45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
242
See IOM, Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing Privacy, Improving Health
Through Research (2009) [IOM Beyond HIPAA], 131–39 (discussing “somewhat artificial
distinction between health research and some closely related health care practices, such as
… quality improvement activities ….”); see also Stacey A. Tovino, The Use and
Disclosure of Protected Health Information for Research Under the Hippa Privacy Rule:
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a minimum, one might expect that as the analysis of health outcomes to
improve clinical care becomes more scientifically rigorous (and its
conclusions therefore more generalizable), it may look less like permissible
“health care operations” and more like restricted “research.” 243 Notably, the
21st Century Cures Act, currently under consideration by Congress, would
resolve this issue by “revis[ing] or clarify[ing]” that research, “including
studies whose purpose is to obtain generalizable knowledge,” falls within
the definition of health care operations. 244
De-identified data. De-identified data isn’t covered at all by the Privacy
Rule. Even for activities that count as “research,” the Privacy Rule applies
only to “individually identifiable health information” and not to “[h]ealth
information that does not identify an individual and with respect to which
there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to
identify an individual.” 245 Although advances in information technology
have made it increasingly easy to re-identify individuals on the basis of
limited information, 246 the Privacy Rule nonetheless provides a safe harbor
that qualifies data as de-identified if seventeen pieces of identifying
information are removed. 247 De-identifying data is a key way to navigate
HIPAA restrictions even for government entities; when California’s health
Unrealized Patient Autonomy and Burdensome Government Regulation, 49 S.D. L. REV.
447, 450–55 (2004) (discussing the applicability of HIPAA restrictions to research).
243
“Research” is separately defined as “a systematic investigation, including research
development, testing, and evaluation designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
244
21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 6 (2015), 114th Congress, § 1124, available at
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr6/BILLS-114hr6ih.xml. The Act was approved by
the House of Representatives on July 10, 2015.
245
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a).
246
See Daniel C. Barth-Jones, “The Re-identification of Governor William Weld’s
Medical Information: A Critical Re-examination of Health Data Identification Risks and
Privacy Problems, Then and Now" (Working Paper June 4, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2076397; see also Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1701, 1716–31, 1736–38 (2009) (describing re-identification generally and in the
HIPAA context).
247
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i). The list includes names, geographic subdivisions
smaller than a state, certain dates directly related to an individual, telephone and fax
numbers, email addresses, social security numbers, medical record numbers, health plan
beneficiary numbers, and other identifying numbers and codes, biometric identifiers, fullface photographic images, and “any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or
code, except as permitted by paragraph(c) of this section.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(A)(R). An exception to the final catch-all item permits the covered entity to assign a nonsubstantive code to allow the covered entity itself to reidentify the information so long as
the covered entity does not use or disclose the code for any other purpose nor disclose the
mechanism for re-identification. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c).
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exchange marketplace, Covered California, begins collecting payer data on
its 1.4 million customers, the data will go to a third-party analytics
company, and the state itself will receive only de-identified data. 248
However, de-identification brings its own problems. The list of
identifiers includes information that may be relevant to researchers,
including dates, ages, and biometric identifiers; excluding this information
limits the value of the data. 249 Moreover, retention of identifiers may be
necessary to link data from different sources and over time. 250 The most
straightforward way to integrate information from different sources—a key
technical challenge discussed above—is to use unique identifying
information from individual records. If Miles Vorkosigan’s records from
different providers and payers are related only by the fact that those records
all pertain to Miles Vorkosigan, the easiest way to link those records is
through his name. 251 Removing identifying information prevents this
aggregation. There are ways around this problem involving translating
identifiable information into unique identifiers through a one-way encoding
process, but they add technical complexity and require at least some form of
centralized infrastructure.
Limited data sets. The Privacy Rule provides a less restrictive
alternative allowing covered entities to use or disclose “limited data sets”
without the need for authorization “only for the purposes of research, public
health, or health care operations.” 252 The list of identifiers that must be
excluded to qualify as a limited data is less restrictive than the exclusions
required to qualify for the de-identification safe harbor. 253 A covered entity
may use or disclose a limited data set only if it enters into a “data use
agreement” obliging the data recipient to use or disclose the protected
health information only for “limited purposes” permitted by the Rule. 254
248

Chad Terhune, California’s Obamacare Exchange to Collect Insurance Data on
Patients, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 21, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fiobamacare-patient-privacy-20150622-story.html.
249
For example, the requirement for removal of any geographic identifier smaller than
a state can significantly limit the assembly of detailed geographic health information. Id. §
164.514(b)(2)(i)(B). For a discussion of this problem see IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note
242, at 230–33.
250
IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 242, at 177-179.
251
See LOIS M. BUJOLD, BROTHERS IN ARMS (Baen Books, 1989) (discussing the
potential consequences of access to uniquely-identified biomedical information and
samples).
252
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e).
253
Id. § 164.514(e)(2). Unlike a fully de-identified data set, a limited data set may
include date, town, state, and zip code; there is also no catch-all category prohibiting “any
other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.” Id.
254
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(i).
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The agreement must specify permitted uses and disclosures, require
safeguards to prevent further use or disclosure, and prohibit recipients from
identifying or contacting the individuals whose health information has been
disclosed. 255
Public health activities. The Privacy Rule explicitly permits use or
disclosure of protected health information for certain public health
activities, including disclosure to a public health authority for surveillance
purposes. 256 This allows disclosures to FDA for postmarketing safety
monitoring under the Sentinel Initiative. 257 A related provision permits
disclosure of information about an FDA-regulated product or activity to its
FDA sponsor in order to collect or report adverse events and to conduct post
marketing surveillance. 258 While this lets drug companies access
information about their own products, it does not permit disclosure of data
about other treatments that could serve as controls, limiting the possibility
of comparative effectiveness research. 259
The foregoing limitations 260 on the Privacy Rule allow some use of
healthcare information in research, although compliance with the conditions
necessary to qualify for these limitations may be burdensome and may limit
the scope of research.
B. Authorization and waivers
In addition to normally permitted uses, the Privacy Rule enables allows
otherwise prohibited uses and disclosures in two circumstances. First,
individual patients may authorize any use of their protected health
information. Second, researchers may obtain waivers of HIPAA
requirements from an Institutional Review Board or a Privacy Board.
The Privacy Rule permits individual patients to authorize the use of
their protected health information for any purpose, including use in research
255

45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(ii).
45 C.F.R. §164.512(b)(i).
257
See Kristen Rosati, Barbara Evans & Deven McGraw, White Paper, HIPAA and
Common Rule Compliance in the Mini-Sentinel Pilot, http://www.mini-sentinel.org/
work_products/About_Us/HIPAA_and_CommonRuleCompliance_in_the_MiniSentinelPilot.pdf.
258
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(iii).
259
Barbara J. Evans, The Ethics of Postmarketing Observational Studies of Drug
Safety Under Section 505(o)(3) of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED.
577, 588-89 (2012).
260
Other, narrower limitations also exist, such as provisions permitting the use of
protected health information to prepare a research protocol and the use of decedents’
information if necessary for research, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii)-(iii).
256
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studies. 261 The requirements for a valid authorization are exacting. It must
include a “specific and meaningful” description of the information to be
used or disclosed; identify those using, disclosing, or receiving the
information; describe each purpose of the requested use or disclosure; and
specify an expiration of the authorization (which, for research uses, may be
“none”). 262 The authorization must be written in plain language and signed
by the individual. 263 It must include statements advising the individual of
his or her right to revoke the authorization in writing, 264 explaining any
consequences to the individual of refusing to sign the authorization, 265 and
warning of the potential for information to be redisclosed by the recipient
and no longer protected under the Privacy Rule. 266
Getting authorizations presents practical problems, but those may be
surmountable. Unfortunately, the use of individual authorizations presents a
different and less tractable problem for research use. There are significant
medical differences between patients who are willing to authorize the use of
their information and those who are not. 267 The need for individual
authorizations is thus a source of selection bias that distorts the results of
observational studies, making them less informative than they would be if
patients did not have the opportunity to remove their health information
from the study.
An Institutional Review Board or a Privacy Board 268 may waive the
authorization requirement for research studies that require such waivers and
meet specified criteria. 269 This can mitigate the serious problem of selection
261

45 C.F.R. § 164.508.
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)
263
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(3), (c)(1)(vi)
264
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2)(i)(A)
265
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2)(ii)
266
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2)(iii).
267
IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 242, at 209–214. It may be, for example, that
patients with prescriptions for Viagra are less willing to authorize the use of their health
records in research than other patients.
268
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(A), (B). A detailed analysis of the interactions of
Privacy Boards (privacy-ensuring entities created by the HIPAA Privacy Rule) and
Institutional Review Boards (research oversight entities created under the Common Rule
governing human subjects research) is beyond the scope of this Article. For overviews of
each, see NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND THE
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/irbandprivacyrule.asp
(2004), and NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PRIVACY BOARDS AND THE HIPAA
PRIVACY RULE, http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/privacy_boards_hipaa_privacy_
rule.asp (2004), respectively.
269
These criteria include that the use or disclosure involves no more than a minimal
risk to privacy of individuals based on an adequate plan to protect from improper use or
disclosure, an adequate plan to destroy the identifiers at the earliest opportunity consistent
262
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bias, but the need for Board review imposes costs and delays. Survey data
indicate that many researchers have found it very difficult to obtain Privacy
Rule waivers. 270 Moreover, ambiguity in the waiver criteria creates
uncertainty, especially for studies that aggregate data from multiple sources
and may therefore require approval from multiple Boards that may interpret
the Privacy Rule differently. 271
C. The HITECH Act and amendments to the Privacy Rule
The HITECH Act fortified the privacy protections of HIPAA in a
number of ways, including applying its provisions to a broader set of
entities, 272 requiring notification to individuals of breaches, 273 and
strengthening enforcement provisions.274 It also imposed a new statutory
requirement for individual authorization for the sale of protected health
information, 275 subject to certain exceptions, including sale for research
purposes for a price that “reflects the cost of preparation and transmittal of
the data.” 276
In the course of amending the Privacy Rule to comply with the HITECH
Act requirements, 277 HHS made a number of changes and interpretations to
with conduct of the research, and adequate written assurances that the protected health
information will not be reused or disclosed to any other person or entity, and that the
research could not practicably be conducted without the waiver and without access to and
use of the protected health information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2).
270
IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 242, at 223.
271
IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 242, at 169–170, 221–227.
272
HITECH Act, supra note 166, §§ 13404 (extending provisions of Privacy Rule to
business associates of covered entities) and 13408 (requiring that covered entities enter into
business associate contracts with organizations such as health information exchanges that
provide data transmission of protected health information to such covered entities).
273
HITECH Act, supra note 166, § 13402 (requiring notification to individuals of
breaches)
274
HITECH Act, supra note 166, § 13410
275
Id. § 13405(d)(1).
276
Id. § 13405(d)(2)(B). Other exceptions include sales for public health activities,
treatment, health care operations, remuneration to a business associate, provision to an
individual of the individual’s protected health information, and other similar exceptions to
be specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. § 13405(d)(2)(A)-(G). See
also Barbara J. Evans, Sustainable Access to Data for Postmarketing Medical Product
Safety Surveillance under the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 11
(2014) (arguing that the cost provisions in HITECH fall short of allowing sustainable
access to postmarket surveillance medical data).
277
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., MODIFICATIONS TO THE HIPAA PRIVACY,
SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT, AND BREACH NOTIFICATION RULES UNDER THE HEALTH
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC AND CLINICAL HEALTH ACT AND THE
GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT; OTHER MODIFICATION TO THE HIPAA
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facilitate authorizations for use of health records in research. 278 HHS
clarified that the receipt of grant funding to perform a research study that
involves provision of protected health information is not considered a sale
of protected health information. 279 In another change not explicitly required
by the statute, HHS amended the Privacy Rule to permit covered entities to
combine authorizations for use and disclosure of health information with
related permission to use biospecimens, 280 and modified its interpretation of
the Privacy Rule to permit use of a single authorization form for multiple
future studies. 281 These changes minimize bureaucratic costs by allowing a
single authorization to cover multiple studies, and even to include future
health information.
Overall, HIPAA creates substantial legal barriers to innovation by
payers. 282 In addition to direct legal restrictions, privacy rules also
exacerbate technical challenges, as when de-identification makes it harder
to integrate information from different sources. Although recent legislation
and modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule have made research uses
easier in some respects, more reform may be necessary to exploit the
promise of research using health records. 283
RULES, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) [2013 HIPAA Modifications].
278
For a critical analysis of these provisions by a noted renowned privacy advocate,
see Mark A. Rothstein, HIPAA Privacy Rule 2.0, J.L. Med. & Ethics 525-528 (Summer
2013)
279
See 2013 HIPAA Modifications, supra note 277, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5606.
280
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3).
281
The new interpretation is explained at 2013 HIPAA Modifications, supra note 277,
78 Fed. Reg. at 5611-13.
282
See Tovino, supra note 216, at 450 (Describing HIPAA’s restrictions on research as
“onerous”).
283
We would be remiss if we did not mention the other side of this argument. Others
have argued that the privacy protections are strikingly inadequate to actually safeguard
patient privacy in the age of electronic medical records and Big Data.283 See, e.g., Sharona
Hoffman, Electronic Health Records and Research: Privacy Versus Scientific Priorities, 10
AM. J. BIOETH. 19 (2010); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and
Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L
REV. 06 (2007). Since we focus here on the role of payer innovation, we describe privacy
rules as challenges for that innovation. Ideal solutions may be Pareto-superior by
maintaining or increasing privacy while facilitating innovation, but may not always be
available. One of us has begun to address such potential improvements in the context of
medical datasets for complex computational modeling. See Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson
Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine (draft manuscript on file with
authors). We do not here take a position on how best to balance privacy and innovation
when they are strictly opposed.
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Yet paradoxically these obstacles may enlarge the role of payers as
custodians of health records in research as research consortia use distributed
networks of data rather than central repositories to avoid triggering HIPAA
violations. These arrangements are an opportunity for payers to expand their
involvement in health research. At the same time, increased payer
participation in innovation may minimize risks to patient privacy by
reducing the need to transfer health records to entities that are not bound by
the protective constraints of HIPAA.

CONCLUSION
Demand-side innovation by healthcare payers has tremendous potential
to improve the healthcare system. Payers have access to large amounts of
health data on millions of patients, and have the opportunity to develop new
information about drug toxicity, comparative effectiveness of different
treatments, and personalized medicine. Just as important, payers have
substantially different incentives than the product-developing innovators
that are more typically the target of innovation policy. As health costs
continue to rise, innovation directed at frugality and efficiency becomes
ever more crucial. But encouraging innovation on the demand side may
require very different policy tools than the standard exclusionary rights used
to motivate firms to develop expensive new products.
The barriers facing payer-innovators are substantial, including technical
hurdles that impede aggregation and analysis of data as well as legal
obstacles designed to protect patient privacy. The peculiar economic and
legal landscape of the health care market may limit the ability of individual
firms to capture the benefits of payer innovation, and the standard rewards
of intellectual property are unlikely to help. However, a multi-pronged
government approach is helping payer innovation move forward. A
combination of funding and mandates for the use of electronic health
records, engagement of stakeholders in building research networks, and
modest changes to privacy rules are helping to make new research
initiatives possible. While we applaud these efforts, there is more to be done
to take advantage of the incentives and capabilities of payers as innovators.
Meanwhile, scholars of innovation law and policy may find a fruitful, if
largely unnoticed, target in demand-side innovation.
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